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Tort Claims and Canadian
Prisoners
Adelina Iftene, Lynne Hanson & Allan Manson"
Prisoners can be tragically wronged by the prison system, as highlighted by the recent Ashley
Smith case, and tort actions have proven to be a problematic form of recourse for prisoners.
Negligence claims made by prisoners face obstacles at every stage of the analysis: duty of care,
standard of care, breach and causation. The authors first offer an overview of the tort litigation
that has come out of Canadian prisons, with afocus on health care-based negligence claims, on
risks arising from other prisoners and on the risk of self-harm. They find that these claims have
been unevenly resolved when the plaintiff is a prisoner. Secondly, the paper considers whether
negligence actionsforprisoners can be expanded by using "conditions ofconftnement"standards
to furnish a novel duty of care. The authors outline several impediments to the imposition of
such a duty. They note that Canadian courts are reluctant to impose duties on public actors,
particularly when the conduct in question walks the line between operational and policy-
oriented action. Because imposing a duty of care with regard to conditions of confinement
would require the courts to make orders with heavy funding implications, courts would in the
authors' view be unlikely to adopt such a duty. Nonetheless, if tort litigation can be made more
accessible to prisoners, the end result may be the improved enforcement of their entitlements and
the betterment of internal prison conditions.
* Adelina Iftene, LLB, LLM, is a PhD candidate. Lynne Hanson, LLB, MA, LLM, is an
adjunct assistant professor at the Faculty of Law, Queen's University. Allan Manson, LLB,
LLM, is a professor at the Faculty of Law, Queen's University.
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Introduction
Prisoners live in an environment totally controlled by perimeter
architecture, internal security and surveillance, disciplinary rules and
official discretion. Inevitably, there will be conflicts, disagreements,
grievances, assaults and injuries. The past fifty years of Canadian prison
law can be characterized more by the pursuit of appropriate remedies
than by the development of substantive law and legal norms. This story
of remedies has had its ups and downs. Positive steps have included
the broadening of the availability of certiorari and the acceptance of a
general duty of fairness in Martineau v Matsqui Institution (No 2) in 1979,1
the entrenchment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2 the
modernization of habeas corpus in the Miller trilogy,' the new Corrections
and Conditional Release Act (CCRA), the provision of legal aid for
prisoners in most Canadian jurisdictions, and the evolution of the role of
the Correctional Investigator. On the downside, we have seen continuing
challenges to the scope of habeas corpus, a persistently dysfunctional
internal grievance system and a general reduction in the availability of
legal aid.
1. (1979), [1980] 1 SCR 602, 15 CR (3d) 1.
2. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK),
1982, c 11.
3. R vMiller, [1985] 2 SCR 613, 52 OR (2d) 585; Cardinal vKent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR
643, 24 DLR (4th) 44; Morin v Canada (National Special Handling Unit Review Committee),
[1985] 2 SCR 662, 24 DLR (4th) 71. The trilogy formed the basis for more recent clarification
of the role of habeas corpus. See May v Ferndale Institution, 2005 SCC 82, [2005] 3 SCR 809.
4. SC 1992, c 20 [CCRA].
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Significantly, this remedy story has occurred within a national context
in which only a small prison law bar has experience with prison issues.
Although both prison monitoring mechanisms and remedial avenues
have improved in recent decades, legitimate grievances and cases of
mistreatment still go unresolved and unaddressed. One reason might
simply be that only a tiny portion of the bar has had any experience with
prison matters. Another reason might be the high threshold of review
that courts regularly apply to legal challenges brought by prisoners. The
limited role of "cruel and unusual punishment claims" under section 12
of the Charter is an example of this,' as is the degree of deference that
Canadian administrative law affords to official decision makers.6 Even
constitutional challenges have been exempted from a correctness standard,
forcing courts to defer even more to administrative decisions.
Prisoners rarely use private law to bring civil claims. Such claims,
when made, often settle without judicial scrutiny. When cases go to trial,
they are typically fact-driven, usually with little analytical attention paid
to the elements of the substantive claims. Prisoners have brought some
successful claims for intentional torts such as battery,' assault' and false
imprisonment."o Actions in negligence are expanding in number but are
still largely unsuccessful.
The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the utility of tort law as a
remedy for prisoners. We focus on negligence, which provides a remedy
for unintended harm or harm caused by careless conduct. The plaintiff
must show that there was a duty of care owed to him or her, and that the
5. Supra note 2, s 12. See Allan Manson "Arbitrary Disproportionality: A New Charter
Standard for Measuring the Constitutionality of Mandatory Minimum Sentences" (2012)
57 Sup Ct L Rev 173 at 174-86.
6. See Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190.
7. See Dori v Barreau du Quebec, 2012 SCC 12, [2012] 1 SCR 395.
8. See Abbott v Canada (1993), 64 FTR 81, 41 ACWS (3d) 753; Proctor v Canada (Attorney
General) (2002), 111 ACWS (3d) 713, [2002] OTR 79 (Sup Ct) (motion for summary
judgment dismissed, case settled outside court).
9. See Abbott v Canada, supra note 8 (assault); British Columbia v Zastowny, 2008 SCC 4,
[2008] 1 SCR 27 (sexual assault).
10. See Hermiz v Canada, 2013 FC 288, 228 ACWS (3d) 585 (Prothonotary), rev'd 2013
FC 764, 230 ACWS (3d) 292 (detaining prisoners past their release date or unjustly holding
a person in segregation); Abbott v Canada, supra note 8; R v Hill (1997), 148 DLR (4th) 337,
36 BCLR (3d) 211 (CA); Brandon v Canada (Correctional Service) (1996), 131 DLR (4th)
761, 105 FTR 243; Canada (Attorney General) vMcArthur, 2010 SCC 63, [2010] 3 SCR 626.
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defendant breached the standard of care by failing to do what a reasonable
person of "ordinary intelligence and prudence"" would have done in
those particular circumstances. The plaintiff must then prove causation
by showing that "but for" the defendant's negligence, his or her injury
would not have occurredl2 and that this injury was not too remote. If
there is no loss, then there is no tort-negligence is not actionable per se."
We approach the task of surveying private law tort actions for
prisoners via a cross-jurisdictional review of the Canadian case law. We
begin by reviewing the nature of the duty owed by corrections authorities
and their staff to prisoners. We consider whether the requisite standard of
care is being met in prisons regarding medical treatment, the prevention
of self-harm and the risk posed to prisoners by other prisoners. Finally,
we consider whether negligence liability could be expanded to improve
conditions of confinement more generally and we observe that there
are substantial obstacles to the creation of a novel duty of care toward
prisoners in the Canadian correctional system.
I. The Duty of Care Owed to Prisoners
To impose tort liability, a court must first find that the defendant
owed a general duty of care to a class of persons of which the plaintiff
is a member, and that the defendant therefore owed a duty toward the
individual plaintiff. In the prison context, negligence actions typically
focus on the duty owed by a public authority and its employees to an
individual plaintiff, the prisoner. The authoritative test for the duty of
care was established by the Supreme Court of Canada in Cooper v Hobart,"
following the House of Lords decision in Anns v Merton London Borough
11. Arland v Taylor, [1955] OR 131 at para 29, 3 DLR 358 (CA).
12. Clements v Clements, 2012 SCC 32, [2012] 2 SCR 181, rev'g (2010), 327 DLR (4th) 1,
298 BCAC 56.
13. The final step of negligence analysis requires the plaintiff to prove that the loss was
not too remote. This element is not fully addressed in this paper, but it is worth noting that
remoteness may bar recovery when prisoners engage in self-injurious behaviour-courts
have found that suicide is by definition "too remote" a consequence. See Wright v Davidson
(1992), 64 BCLR (2d) 113, 88 DLR (4th) 698 (CA).
14. 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 SCR 537. See also Childs v Desormeaux, 2006 SCC 18, [2006] 1
SCR 643.
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Council." A duty is owed where the harm was the reasonably foreseeable
consequence of the defendant's act, where there was asufficient relationship
of proximity between the parties and where there are no residual policy
considerations that negate the imposition of a duty. Courts are reluctant
to impose a duty of care on public authorities, and tort actions will often
founder where there is insufficient proximity between the government
and an individual, or on policy grounds where the imposition of a private
law duty will interfere with the public authority's obligation to provide
good governance to the general public. A further limit is that governments
will only be held liable for operational decisions and are immune from
suit for policy decisions at a higher level of governmental authority."
Public authorities will, however, owe a duty to private parties where
there is a special relationship of proximity between the government and
a particular individual."
These potential limits present no problem where there is an established
duty of care, but might prevent the recognition of a novel duty. As such,
they will be explored in more detail at the end of this paper, where we
propose that conditions of confinement might form the basis for a new
claim in negligence.
A prison's duty to provide a safe environment is well established
in the case law. Both legislation and internal directives confirm that
Correctional Service Canada (CSC) must provide federal prisoners with
safe premises. For instance, section 70 from the CCRA establishes that:
"The Service shall take all reasonable steps to ensure that penitentiaries, the
penitentiary environment, the living and working conditions of prisoners
and the working conditions of staff members are safe, healthful and free of
15. (1977), [1978] AC 728 HL (Eng).
16. The policy/operational distinction was authoritatively set out by the Supreme Court
of Canada. See just v British Columbia, [1989] 2 SCR 1228, 64 DLR (4th) 689 [cited to SCR].
This test was later incorporated into the Anns/Cooper test as part of the broader residual
policy concerns that might negate the duty of care. See Cooper v Hobart, supra note 14.
17. Courts will more likely find a special relationship when certain conditions are met.
See Fullowka v Pinkerton's of Canada, 2010 SCC 5, [2010] 1 SCR 132 [Fullowka] (known
risk to a group of people); Heaslip Estate vMansfield Ski Club, 2009 ONCA 594, 96 OR (3d)
401 (direct communication between plaintiff and defendant).
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practices that undermine a person's sense of personal dignity."" Prisoners
are under the physical control and legal responsibility of correctional
systems and they are dependent on them for the necessities of life. There
have only been a few reported decisions based on a failure to provide
safe premises, probably because such claims are often settled out of court.
In Chilton v Canada, CSC admitted its liability for the physical harm
suffered by a prisoner working in an industrial woodworking shop in
the penitentiary, and the plaintiff was awarded $2,500 in damages."9 Such
cases are rarely matters of establishing liability, but rather focus on the
damages award.20
Undoubtedly, prisons can be dangerous places. Prison officials exercise
control, and it is within their power to make decisions and take steps to
protect prisoners from each other and from themselves.2 1 Federally, the
CCRA clearly enforces the common law and statutory duty to control
the behaviour of prisoners and to protect them against harm.22 In New
Brunswick, a duty to control behaviour was found when twenty-one
18. Supra note 4, s 70. See Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-602
("[t]he Service shall, to ensure a safe and healthful penitentiary environment, ensure that
all applicable federal health, safety, sanitation and fire laws are complied with in each
penitentiary and that every penitentiary is inspected regularly by the persons responsible
for enforcing those laws", s 83(1)).
19. 2008 FC 1047, [2008] 336 FTR 308, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 33705 (September 16,
2010).
20. See also Sarvanis v Canada (1998), 156 FTR 265, 82 ACWS (3d) 897 (CSC denied
liability for an injury suffered by the plaintiff while working in the penitentiary's hay barn,
but the Court dismissed the government's motion for summary judgment). This decision
was appealed to the SCC on a related question of whether the plaintiff's suit in tort should
be barred by the concurrent recovery of disability benefits under the Canada Pension
Plan. For the Court, lacobucci J once again denied the motion for summary judgment,
finding that this was not double recovery and that the tort law claim could proceed. See
Sarvanis v Canada, 2002 SCC 28, [2002] 1 SCR 921. There is only one case where a claim in
negligence for an accident sustained by a prisoner while working in a penitentiary's garage
was dismissed as "manifestly without foundation". Beauchemin v Canada, [1979] FCJ No
901 (QL) at para 6 (TD).
21. See CCRA, supra note 4, ss 5, 69, 70, 76, 86.
22. See Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co, [1970] AC 1004 HL (Eng) (first case to institute a
duty to control the behaviour of prisoners in order to not harm third parties). The effect of
a statutory duty on a finding of a common law duty of care is an interesting question and
currently beyond the scope of this paper. In Canada, there is no tort of statutory breach,
but courts are increasingly willing to ground a common law duty of public authorities on
the presence of a co-existent statutory duty.
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prisoners were killed in a fire set by another prisoner.23 Funk Estate v Clapp
similarly held that there was a duty to control a prisoner in order to
protect him from himself.2 4 More recently, Wiebe v Canada (Attorney
General) held that there was a duty to supervise a prisoner who assaulted
Wiebe, the plaintiff.25 Wiebe was incarcerated in a minimum-security
federal facility and was living in a house with the prisoner who eventually
assaulted him. He told several correctional officers that tensions were
building between himself and the other prisoner but they did not report
his concerns. Ultimately, the other prisoner beat Wiebe severely. The
trial judge found CSC liable in negligence for failing to supervise, but this
decision was reversed in the somewhat cryptic Manitoba Court of Appeal
decision. For a unanimous court, Monnin JA held that, notwithstanding
the trial judge's finding that there was a well-established duty of care
owed, CSC was not liable because the occurrence was not foreseeable. 2 6
Monnin JA did not indicate whether this lack of foreseeability precluded
a duty or whether this was a matter of causation. 27
In other cases, the duty to protect prisoners from harm has been
framed as an "obligation to take reasonable steps to intervene and protect
the at-risk inmate", 28 a "duty to keep [the prisoner] safe and . . . to
promptly come to his rescue", 29 a duty to "attend to the safety of the
inmates",3 0 a "duty to take reasonable care of inmates"," an "obligation
23. See Williams et al v Saint John, New Brunswick and Chubb Industries Ltd (1985), 34
CCLT 299, 66 NBR (2d) 10 (CA).
24. 54 DLR (4th) 512 at 519, [1989] BCWLD 102 (CA).
25. 2006 MBCA 159, [2007] 2 WWR 598 [Wiebe], rev'g 2006 MBQB 5 (available on QL),
leave to appeal to SCC refused, 31860 (10 May 2007).
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid. Justice Monnin also found that the prisoner's suit failed on causation, on the
grounds that no action by the prison officials or guards could have prevented the attack.
He further held that the trial judge erred in applying the material contribution test rather
than the "but for" test. Ibid.
28. Carr v Canada, 2008 FC 1416 at para 23, 339 FTR 50.
29. Guitare v Canada (2002), 224 FTR 272 at para 1, 118 ACWS (3d) 310.
30. Chilton v Canada, supra note 19 at para 55. See Miclash v Canada, 2003 FCT 113, 227
FTR 116.
31. Scott v Canada, [1985] FCJNo 35 (QL) (TD).
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to take reasonable steps to protect an inmate from fellow inmates",32 a
"duty to ensure the safety of the inmates"," an obligation "not to act
in a fashion that put the [prisoner] at risk of harm that was reasonably
foreseeable"," and a duty to "protect .. . from foreseeable risks"." A
statutory duty exists to ensure that the penitentiary is "safe, healthful and
free of practices that undermine a person's sense of personal dignity"." In
Maljkovich v Canada, the Federal Court held that there are statutory and
common law duties of care to "incarcerate [the prisoner] in conditions
that are healthful and do not cause [the prisoner] to suffer physical
discomfort and upset"." Other duties recognized by the case law relate
to the conduct of investigations and mandated reviews, to record keeping
and to the providing of information. For example, courts have held that
there is a duty of care owed when investigating a disciplinary offence"
and that there is a duty to review a segregation order on a timely basis."
Conversely, it has been held that there is no duty "to advise [the prisoner]
that he should not tell other inmates about his transfer".4 0 Similarly, in
Farrows-Shelley v Canada, the Court held that there was no duty to warn
a prisoner that his double-bunked cellmate was prone to violence and
infected with HIV and hepatitis C, as there was "no foreseeable danger
to him"."
To summarize, the duty of care owed by prisons to prisoners is a
recognized category in private law, particularly in relation to the safety of
32. Coumont v Canada (Correctional Services) (1994), 77 FTR 253 at para 38, 47 ACWS
(3d) 1196 [Coumont]. See Hodgin v Canada (Solicitor General) (1998), 201 NBR (2d) 279, 514
APR 279 (TD) [Hodgin].
33. Ligbre v Canada (1999), 159 FTR 87 at para 5, 87 ACWS (3d) 603.
34. Carlson v Canada (1998), 80 ACWS (3d) 316 at para 23 (available on QL) (FCTD). See
Wild v Canada (Correctional Services), 2004 FC 942, 256 FTR 240; Bastarache v Canada,
2003 FC 1463, 243 FTR 274; Timm v Canada (1964), [1965] 1 Ex CR 174 (available on QL);
Iwanicki v Ontario (Minister of Correctional Services), 45 WCB (2d) 600, [2000] OTR 181
(Sup Ct) [Iwanicki].
35. Pete vAxworthy, 2004 BCSC 1337 at para 62, 34 BCLR (4th) 146. See Russell v Canada,
2000 BCSC 650 at para 6 (available on QL).
36. CCRA, supra note 4, s 70. See Curry v Canada, 2006 FC 63, 145 ACWS (3d) 620.
37. 2005 FC 1398 at para 19, 281 FTR 227. See CCRA, supra note 4, s 70.
38. See Hermiz v Canada, supra note 10.
39. See R v Hill, supra note 10 at para 17.
40. Batty v Logan, [2000] OTC 53 at para 17, 94 ACWS (3d) 657 (Sup Ct).
41. 2003 FCT 415 at para 31, 232 FTR 77.
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physical premises and the provision of the necessities of life. A common
law duty has also frequently been imposed to protect prisoners from self-
harm and from harm by other prisoners. As we will see below, tort claims
for such harm frequently fail at the standard of care and causation stages.
II. Medical Care in Prisons
Health care in federal penitentiaries is provided by CSC and the health
of prisoners is its responsibility. Federally, the CCRA states that CSC
"shall provide every inmate with essential health care" and "shall conform
to professionally accepted standards".4 2 Three sets of defendants could
potentially be held responsible for negligence in prison medical care: the
correctional system, prison staff and contract health professionals not
employed by CSC. We will discuss each in turn.
A. The Correctional System
Courts have found a "duty to provide medical care,"" a duty to
provide "adequate medical care and attention for . . . health and well-
being during ... detention,"" and a duty to inquire about the inmate's
health." In Lavoie v Canada, the Court stated that "the duty to provide
medical care is a requirement placed on correctional services as part of
their general duty of care", but that this did not include a "duty to consult
in such matters as hiring medical services". 6 In the federal penitentiary
system, health care is also thoroughly regulated by directives that set out
the obligations CSC owes prisoners and that establish the standard of care
42. Supra note 4, s 86.
43. Sutherland v Canada, 2003 FC 1516 at para 67, [2003] 243 FTR 297; Levasseur v Canada,
2004 FC 976 (available on WL Can).
44. Steele v Ontario, 1993 CarswellOnt 2686 (WL Can) at para 3 (Ct J (Gen Div)). See also
Swayze vDafoe, [2002] OTC 699, 116 ACWS (3d) 781 (Sup Ct).
45. Lipcsei v Central Saanich (District), [1995]7 WWR 582, 8 BCLR (3d) 325 (SC) [Lipcsei].
46. [2008] OJNo 4564 (QL) at para 13 (Sup Ct).
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for physical and mental illness." These duties were also recognized in case
law prior to the enactment of the CCRA."8
While most negligence claims will assert carelessness on the part of
prison staff (addressed in Part II-B), a prison system may be held liable
for failing to ensure that effective medical services are in place. Effective
medical services include timely access to health care, adequate record
keeping, reporting requirements and supervision of medical staff. A useful
comparator is a hospital's responsibility to provide proper instruction
and supervision, and to ensure that all contract physicians are qualified
and have access to proper facilities, equipment and resources." In other
words, these cases involve systems negligence, i.e., systems that are
negligently designed or operated, or are unreasonably unsafe.
An obstacle to prison liability is posed by the potential finding that
the physicians are independent contractors and the prison is therefore
not liable for any negligence on their part."o However, we would argue
that the existence of a contractual relationship with physicians should
not alter the primary duty owed by the correctional system to prisoners.
In Braun Estate v Vaughan, the Manitoba Court of Appeal held that a
hospital's duty is not displaced or altered by the fact that its doctors are
independent contractors:
[W]hether the physician is a private physician holding hospital privileges or a salaried
employee is of little consequence. In terms of the negligence of the institution, the question
is whether there was a duty of care on the hospital, and if so, whether it was breached. The
status of the doctor in such circumstances should not matter."
47. See Correctional Service Canada, Commissioner's Directives, CD 259: Exposure to
Second Hand Smoke; CD 800: Health Services; CD 803: Consent to Assessment, Treatment
and Release oflnformation; CD 821: Management oflnfectious Diseases; CD 840: Psychological
Services; CD 843: Management of Prisoner SelfInjurious and Suicidal Behavior; CD 850:
Mental Health Services (Ottawa: Corrections Service Canada, 2009-2013) available online:
<http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca >.
48. See British Columbia (Attorney General) vAstaforoff (1983), 6 CCC (3d) 498, 54 BCLR
309 (CA); R v Hall (1996), 45 Alta LR (3d) 166, [1997] 4 WWR 390.
49. Ellen I Picard & Gerald B Robertson, Legal Liability of Doctors and Hospitals in
Canada, 3d ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1997) at 367.
50. See Oswald v Canada (1997), 126 FTR 281, 69 ACWS (3d) 854 [cited to FTR]; Hickey
v Canada, 2007 FC 246, 309 FTR 202.
51. (2000), 145 Man R (2d) 35 at para 44, 94 ACWS (3d) 579 (CA).
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Similar reasoning should apply to prisons: even in the absence of primary
negligence on the part of the correctional system, in our view, prisons
ought to be vicariously liable for the torts of health professionals,
whether they are employees or contractors. In 1997, in Oswald v Canada,
the Federal Court rejected this view, holding that even though a surgeon
was liable for failing to exercise appropriate professional judgment, CSC
had nonetheless fulfilled its duty "by arranging for services of qualified
members of the medical and dental professions".5 2 This holding seems
inconsistent with the fact that the actual relationship between CSC and
physicians more closely resembles an employer-employee relationship in
light of the degree of control and supervision that prisons have over many
aspects of medical care, including nursing, medication, appointments,
follow-up and prison visits. Recent case law in other contexts indicates
that vicarious liability will ordinarily be imposed where a worker is
subject to employer direction and control, and where the employer is in
a better position than the worker to guard against risk, allocate costs and
insure against loss." There is no reason why this approach should not
apply to prisons as well.
52. Supra note 50 at para 60.
53. See Douglas v Kinger, 2008 ONCA 452, [2008] 57 CCLT (3d) 15, leave to appeal to
SCC refused, 32787 (11 December 2008). One could also argue that the prison's obligation
to provide health care to prisoners is a non-delegable duty, so that it is not open to them
to avoid liability by pointing to the negligence of its subcontractors. See Lewis (Guardian
ad litem of) v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1145, [1998] 5 WWR 732, McLachlin J,
concurring (the Ministry of Transportation could not escape liability by hiring an
independent contractor because they owed a non-delegable duty). This is
a duty not only to take care, but to ensure that care is taken. It is not strict liability,
since it requires someone (the independent contractor) to have been negligent.
But if it applies, it is no answer for the employer to say, "I was not negligent in
hiring or supervising the independent contractor". The employer is liable for the
contractor's negligence. The employer already has a personal duty at common
law or by statute to take reasonable care. The non-delegable duty doctrine adds
another obligation-the duty to ensure that the independent contractor also takes
reasonable care.
Ibid at para 50.
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B. Prison Staff
A prison service will be vicariously liable for the torts of its employees
so long as those acts are sufficiently connected to their employment, in
the sense that the job creates or enhances the potential risk of tortious
conduct." This is particularly likely to be true in prisons where friction
and confrontation, coupled with the opportunity for abuse of power, are
inherent in the enterprise." There are numerous cases in which prison
staff members have been found negligent and the correctional institution
found to be vicariously liable. 6 In at least two cases, a breach of the
standard of care was found when prison guards failed to send a prisoner
whose condition had visibly deteriorated to a doctor." A breach was also
found when a prisoner who had been shot by a guard failed to receive
medical treatment." In other cases, however, no breach of the duty to
provide medical care was found where medical assistance was delayed to
the point that the prisoner suffered serious consequences, which have
included death or a serious injury.9
Failure to respond to medical emergencies is a well-documented
problem in prisons. In 2007, the Office of the Correctional Investigator
(OCI) stated that two-thirds of medical emergencies in the federal
system were not responded to properly60 and there has been little or no
54. See Bazley v Curry, [1999] 2 SCR 534, 174 DLR (4th) 145.
55. See ibid.
56. See Benard v Canada, 2003 FCT 41, 2003 CFPI 41; Lavoie v Canada, supra note 46;
Lipcsei, supra note 45; Geary vAlberta (Edmonton Remand Centre), 2004 ABQB 19, 25 Alta
LR (4th) 231.
57. Steele v Ontario, supra note 44; Lipcsei, supra note 45.
58. See Abbott v Canada, supra note 8.
59. See Swayze v Dafoe, supra note 44 (Swayze ingested drugs and choked on his vomit. The
officers met delays in transporting him from his cell to the hospital because they required
additional guards, as he was a very large individual, and he died en route); Corner v Canada
(2002), 119 ACWS (3d) 502 (available on QL) (Ont Sup CtJ) (the prisoner was attacked in
the yard of a maximum security facility and stabbed from behind, and he alleged that he
did not receive medical care immediately); Bastarache v Canada, supra note 34 (the prisoner
was hit over the head by another prisoner with a metal bar and he did not receive medical
attention until the following day, when the correctional officer sent him for medical
treatment after noticing blood on his bedding).
60. Office of the Correctional Investigator, Deaths in Custody: Final Report by Thomas
Gabor (Ottawa: Office of the Correctional Investigator, 2007), online: <http://www.oci-
bec.gc.ca>.
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improvement since then.61 The 2011-2012 OCI report62 focused on deaths
in custody, and the Correctional Investigator remarked once again on the
deficiencies, both systemic and case-specific, that prevented an effective
response to emergencies." The recent events involving Kinew James
reinforces these conclusions.6 James pressed the emergency button in her
cell at the Regional Psychiatric Centre in Saskatoon repeatedly for over
61. Office of the Correctional Investigator, Final Assessment of the Correction Service
of Canada's Response to Deaths In Custody by Howard Sapers (Ottawa: Office of the
Correctional Investigator, 2009-11), online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca> .
62. Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional
Investigator 2011-2012 by Howard Sapers (Ottawa: Office of the Correctional Investigator,
2012) online: <http:// www.oci-bec.gc.ca > .
63. Ibid at n 19. The OCI noted:
These reviews continue to point to recurring compliance problems, repeated
mistakes and structural weaknesses previously identified by this Office:
1. Responses to medical emergencies that are either inappropriate or inadequate.
2. Critical information-sharing failures between clinical and front-line staff.
3. Recurring pattern of deficiencies in monitoring suicide pre-indicators.
4. Compliance issues related to the quality and frequency of security patrols,
rounds and counts.
5. Management of mentally ill offenders too often driven by security responses
rather than appropriate health care and treatment.
6. CSC investigative reports and processes require consistency and improvement.
In the reporting period, the following individual failures were identified via the
Office's section 19 review procedures:
* Failure to verify a living, breathing body consistent with life-preservation
principles during security rounds and patrols.
* Failure to initiate life-saving procedures (CPR) without delay.
* Failure to apply automatic external defibrillator (AED) as part of a mandatory
resuscitation process.
* Problems in recording and communicating a history of significant self-harm
and suicide attempts in a transfer of an inmate from one institution to another.
* Failure to "reset" the segregation clock for cases involving prisoner transfer.
* Failure to comply with emergency response protocols and preservation of
evidence following an inmate murder.
Ibid at n 20.
64. See Kim Mackrael, "Corrections Canada changes rules for medical emergencies after
inmate's death", The Globe and Mail (11 April 2013) online: The Globe and Mail <http://
www.theglobeandmail.com >.
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an hour and other prisoners pushed the buttons in their cells in an effort
to trigger a response, but to no avail. James died of a heart attack before
help arrived. This sort of situation has arisen in provincial custody as
well. In one instance, a prisoner named Julie Bilotta gave birth in her
segregation cell. The infant was born prematurely and in breech position
because guards refused to believe that Bilotta was going into labour and
threatened her with isolation if she did not stop screaming. As a result,
the baby had to be put on a respirator in a hospital and Bilotta needed
a blood transfusion.65 Taken together, these instances demonstrate the
unacceptably low de facto standard of care in prisons in response to
medical emergencies.
C. Contract Health Professionals
The duty owed by CSC does not change the doctor-patient relationship;
physicians still owe prisoners the same duty of care that they owe to other
patients.66 The relationship is an asymmetrical one, characterized by the
patient's reliance and dependence on the physician's knowledge, skill
and control.6 1 Physicians must adhere to a standard of reasonable care in
all the circumstances,6 8 so the assessment of what is negligent should be
no different in prisons than it is in the broader community. However, a
number of cases involving prisoners have concluded, without explaining
65. See "Guards inside Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre should have listened to
pregnant prisoner", Editorial, The Globe and Mail (15 October 2012) online: The Globe
and Mail <http://www.theglobeandmail.com>.
66. See Ewert v Marshall, 2009 BCSC 762, 187 ACWS (3d) 1052 [Ewert].
67. The doctor-patient relationship has been characterized as a fiduciary relationship.
See Norberg v Wynrib, [1992] 2 SCR 226, 92 DLR (4th) 449, McLachlin J ( "it is readily
apparent that the doctor-patient relationship shares the peculiar hallmark of the fiduciary
relationship-trust, the trust of a person with inferior power that another person who has
assumed superior power and responsibility will exercise that power for his or her good and
only for his or her good and in his or her best interests" at 272). This power imbalance
would clearly be present in the prison context, given the vulnerability of the prisoner
population to the unilateral exercise of authority.
68. See ter Neuzen v Korn, [1995] 3 SCR 674, 127 DLR (4th) 577; hite v Turner (1981),
31 OR (2d) 773, 120 DLR (3d) 269 (H Ct ), aff'd (1982), 47 OR (2d) 764, 12 DLR (4th)
319 (CA).
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the established standard of care, that there was no evidence the medical
worker had failed to act in accordance with the standard of practice."
Causation may also pose a hurdle in the prison medical context. In
one controversial case, Hickey v Canada," an HIV-positive prisoner
claimed damages for the negligence of a prison doctor when he was given
an overdose of medication and developed a peripheral neuropathy, a
condition not inherent in HIV-positive people. The Court held that the
plaintiff could not prove a causal relationship, as HIV itself might also
cause the condition in question. There was conflicting medical evidence
on this point and to make the causal connection the prisoner would have
had to bring additional expert evidence that was not readily available.
Arguably, this burden was too heavy-calling for scientific proof that
went well beyond the "robust and pragmatic" approach to the "but for"
test, as set out in Snell v Farrelln and endorsed in Clements.72 The Court
in Sutherland v Canada imposed a similarly high threshold, finding that
causation was not established because the prisoner was unable to prove
that the delay in providing medical care was linked to the deterioration
of his ulcer condition.
Judging by the few cases that have made it to court, there is an obvious
difference between the standards of care imposed on health professionals
within the prison context and the standard applied within the community.
It is unclear why courts have been inconsistent in finding negligence in
situations of delayed response to medical emergencies, or in cases where
skill, resources or proper supervision were lacking. The tendency to
impose a higher standard of proof of causation is worrisome, as it can
require medical evidence that the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected
to produce. Finally, it seems contrary to public policy and to the law of
vicarious liability to hold that the correctional system cannot be held
69. See Pete v Axworthy, supra note 35; Vittis v Younger (1990), 22 ACWS (3d) 1083
(available on WL Can) (BCSC); Ewert, supra note 66; Gawich v Klar, 2010 ONSC 4972,
192 ACWS (3d) 409.
70. Supra note 50.
71. [1990] 2 SCR 311, 107 NBR (2d) 94.
72. For different concerns raised by this case, see Sandra Ka Hon Chu, "Federal Court
Says Crown Not Liable for HIV-Positive Prisoner's Illness" (2007) 12:2-3 HIV/AIDS
Policy & Law Review 43.
73. Supra note 43.
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liable for the malpractice of its subcontractors." As long as medical staff is
working for the correctional system, even as contractor or subcontractor,
there is no legal reason not to apply principles of vicarious liability. This
point is reinforced by the fact that prisoners cannot freely contract with
the health professionals of their choice, and are completely dependent
on the decisions made by CSC in that regard. Future court decisions in
this area should enforce the principles of the CCRA and the obligation
to apply the same standard of care equally to all patients, whoever and
wherever they may be.
III. Risks from Other Prisoners and the Risk of
Self-Harm
A. Risks from Other Prisoners
The duty to protect prisoners from other prisoners has been clearly
recognized by Canadian courts and is probably the most frequent basis for
negligence claims in prison litigation. However, such actions frequently
fail to establish a breach of the standard of care. It seems that Canadian
courts, like their British counterparts, believe that prison violence is
inherent. The courts purport to apply the ordinary test for determining
the standard of care, but often conclude that a reasonable person would
not have done a better job at monitoring the prisoners and find no breach
without offering a sustained analysis." In Pete v Axworthy, for example,
the trial judge found that transferring dangerous offenders to a minimum-
security facility constituted a breach of the standard of care and held
officials liable for the harm suffered by another prisoner at the hands of
a violent offender."6 The BC Court of Appeal overturned this decision,
finding that the standard imposed by the trial judge was too high. To
74. This is arguably a situation where a non-delegable duty should be found. See Ewert,
supra note 66. Prisons should ensure that care is taken by doctors, regardless of their
contractual status.
75. Scott v Canada, supra note 31; Ligbre v Canada, supra note 33; Coumont, supra note 32;
Russell v Canada, supra note 35; Neeson v Canada, 2012 FC 77, 403 FTR 296.
76. Supra note 35.
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discharge their duty, the Court of Appeal held, officers only had to watch
the violent offender closely, which they did to the best of their ability."
In some cases, the courts have found a breach of duty where officials
had failed to act on repeated signs that a prisoner was likely to be
assaulted by another prisoner." Courts have also been more likely to find
negligence when the harm was caused by the breach of an established
rule. For example, prematurely opening the door to a cell (resulting in
an assault by another prisoner) was considered to be a breach of existing
policy rules, and thus to constitute a breach of the standard of care.
Nonetheless, there are plenty of rules that leave room for interpretation.
There is clearly an obligation to supervise prisoners while in the prison
yard, but courts have often been excessively lenient in enforcing that
obligation. For example, Hamilton v Canada held that the standard of
care was met even though the part of the yard where a violent act occurred
was not monitored by cameras.so There were guards around who could
have seen the area in question but did not because they did not mingle
with prisoners. Similarly, where there have been sudden attacks with no
prior indications courts have found no breach on the part of guards."
The causation requirement poses another potential obstacle to a
finding of negligence in these cases. Where the immediate cause of harm
was the wrongful actions of a third party (i.e., another prisoner), a breach
of the duty of care by guards is often found not to have been a sufficient
cause to warrant liability. Coumont v Canada held that even if there was a
history of stabbings in a certain part of an institution, the officials' failure
to supervise that place did not amount to a breach and was not ultimately
the cause of the plaintiff's stabbing.8 2 Similarly, Iwanicki v Canada held
that even if the prison had fallen below the standard of care by giving
razors to prisoners, the breach was not found to be causally linked to
the stabbing of the plaintiff with a razor." By requiring the plaintiff to
77. Pete v British Columbia (Attorney General), 2005 BCCA 449, 258 DLR (4th) 657, leave
to appeal to SCC refused, 31208 (9 February 2006).
78. See Carr v Canada, supra note 28; Miclash v Canada, supra note 30; Squires v Canada
(Attorney General), 2002 NBQB 309, 253 NBR (2d) 326.
79. See Guitare v Canada, supra note 29.
80. [2001] OTC 617 (available on QL) (Sup Ct J).
81. Supra note 25; Hocdgin, supra note 32.
82. Coumont, supra note 32.
83. Iwanicki, supra note 34.
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show a clear connection between the breach of the standard of care and
the attack, the Court arguably went beyond the robust and pragmatic
approach endorsed in Clements-an approach which would obviously
have led to a finding of liability on these facts, as the injury would not
have occurred "but for" the prison's negligence in providing razors." In
the same vein, the Manitoba Court of Appeal in Wiebe held that the "but
for" test had not been met because nothing that the guards could have
done would have prevented the "violent and unforeseen outburst" in
question." Thus, currently, the main obstacle to satisfying the causation
requirement in cases where prison officers have failed to control a third
party is the view on the part of the courts that these are random acts of
violence which cannot be predicted or prevented.
B. Duty to Prevent SelfHarm
The duty to protect prisoners from harm includes harm done
to oneself." Liability has been imposed in cases of self-harm where
supervision has been found to be inadequate. In particular, a breach of the
standard of care has generally been found where a guard has not followed
an established protocol. In Funk v Clapp, a breach was found when the
prisoner committed suicide with his belt, which was not confiscated
because the guard did not properly check him for such objects as the
protocol required." Similarly, in Dix v Canada, the plaintiff was subjected
to a mentally abusive interrogation, and the prison was found liable when
he subsequently attempted suicide in custody."
84. Supra note 12.
85. Supra note 25 at para 45. In reaching this finding, the Court of Appeal in Wiebe relied
on the Bonnie Mooney case, where the BC Court of Appeal found that the RCMP were
not liable for failing to prevent a violent attack by Ms. Mooney's ex-partner because police
and governments cannot prevent domestic violence. See BM v British Columbia (Attorney
General), 2004 BCCA 402, [2004] 10 WWR 286.
86. See Funk Estate v Clapp, supra note 24; Dix v Canada (Attorney General), 2002 ABQB
580, 7 Alta LR (4th) 205 [Dix].
87. Funk Estate v Clapp, supra note 24.
88. Dix, supra note 86. After being arrested, Dix was subjected to eleven hours of
interrogation without any food or drinks, after which police had him drive to the crime
scene. At bail hearings, police used a letter that they knew was false to try to show that
Dix was a dangerous offender. He was kept in custody as a result, and during that time he
attempted suicide. Ibid.
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Claims where protocols are less clear often fail to establish that the
standard of care was breached. In Rhora v Ontario, the plaintiff was
known to be mentally disturbed."9 He had killed one of his cellmates
during his first night in custody. Although the police later claimed there
was no indication that Rhora was violent or suicidal,9 0 the following
day he injured his head by banging it on a cell wall. Rhora's suit in
negligence was dismissed, and this finding was upheld by the Ontario
Court of Appeal two years later." The Court found that, while the
police should have provided more information to prison authorities
on Rhora's psychiatric history, the rest of the police officer's decisions
were appropriate because there was no evidence that the detention centre
would have acted differently with more information. Failure to establish
a breach of the standard of care and causation prevented a finding of
negligence. Similarly, in Gerstel v Penticton (City), no negligence was
found in the supervision of a schizophrenic prisoner who, on the basis
of delusions, dove headfirst onto the floor of his cell, rendering him a
quadriplegic.9 2 He had been under no special supervision, even though his
medical history showed that his illness was intractable and that he had not
responded to treatment.
The Ashley Smith case provides tragic evidence of the problems with
the federal correctional system's management of self-injurious prisoners.
The OCI investigator has published a number of reports on this issue and
has requested immediate changes." Smith was a mentally ill teenager who
spent most of her sentence in segregation. She went through a number
of transfers, undergoing a new assessment process in each institution. As
a consequence, there was no continuity in her medical treatment, and
she repeatedly engaged in self-injurious behaviour. At Grand Valley
Institution for Women, guards were told not to remove ligatures from
around her neck or to intervene in any way. Senior staff did not take her
suicidal attempts seriously, dismissing them as mere cries for attention.
The order not to intervene was supported by a CSC psychiatrist who
concluded that Smith was not an imminent danger to herself or to others,
89. [2004] OTC 651, 132 ACWS (3d) 1180 (Sup Ct J).
90. Ibid.
91. Rhora v Ontario (2006), 43 CCLT (3d) 78, 217 OAC 307 (CA).
92. (1995), 9 BCLR (3d) 49, 57 ACWS (3d) 118 (SC).
93. See Office of Correctional Investigator, A Preventable Death by Howard Sapers
(Ottawa: Office of Correctional Investigator, 2008) online: <http://www.oci-bec.gc.ca >.
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despite frequent self-injurious acts. Eventually she succeeded in strangling
herself while guards watched from her cell door." Subsequent investigation
showed that Smith's medical files did not accompany her transfers in a
timely way and that certain psychologists had recommended Ms. Smith
be transferred to a hospital because segregation was not a proper response
to her illness. Smith herself had filed several grievances, which were never
answered." They came to light only at the coroner's inquest that started
five years after her death. 6 The coroner's jury rejected the argument that
the death was a suicide and returned a verdict of homicide."
In light of the obligations arising from the common law, legislation
and directives," the courts would appear to be more lenient to the
correctional system than they should be. This system is failing to meet
established medical standards in dealing with suicidal prisoners, who
are instead placed in segregation apparently for their safety, with little
or no treatment. This approach provides no therapeutic benefit, and
there is good evidence to suggest that the rigours of segregation actually
exacerbate symptoms of mental illness."
94. See e.g. Colin Perkel, "Corrections actions 'unacceptable'in Ashley Smith case, Harper
says", The Globe andMail (1 November 2012), online: The Globe and Mail <http://www.
theglobeandmail.com >.
95. See ibid.
96. See e.g. Donovan Vincent, "Ashley Smith not psychotic, psychologist testifies at
inquest", Toronto Star (4 March 2013) online: The Star <http://www.thestar.com>;
Donovan Vincent, "Ashley Smith's ex-psychologist tells inquest he felt 'undermined'
by decision to transfer her to Saskatoon", Toronto Star (5 March 2013) online: The Star
<http://www.thestar.com>; Donovan Vincent, "Ashley Smith turned down right to
apply for full parole, inquest told", Toronto Star (26 March 2013) online: The Star <http://
www.thestar.com>.
97. Colin Perkel, "Ashley Smith's death should be ruled homicide, lawyer argues", The
Globe and Mail (26 November 2013), A8.
98. See e.g. CSC, CD 843 Management of Prisoner SelfInjurious and Suicidal Behaviour,
supra note 47.
99. See Ivan Zinger, Cheramy Wichman & DA Andrews, "The Psychological Effects of
60 Days in Administrative Segregation" (2001) 43:1 Can J Crim 50; Ronald Aday, Aging
Prisoners: Crisis in American Corrections (Westport, Conn: Greenwood Publishing Group,
2003) at 101-05; House of Commons, Standing Committee on Public Safety and National
Security, Mental Health and Drug and Alcohol Addiction in the Federal Correctional System
(December 2010) at 13 (Chair: Kevin Sorensen); Correctional Service Canada, Federally
Sentenced Offenders with Mental Disorders: Correctional Outcomes and Correctional Response
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IV. Conditions of Confinement
We observed at the outset that the correctional system has a well-
established duty to provide prisoners with a safe environment. In Part IV,
when we speak of conditions of confinement, we are referring to broader
systemic concerns about the general quality of the prison environment
and prisoners' entitlement to a certain standard of living. There is no
clear boundary between safe premises and safe conditions of confinement.
Generally, "premises" refers strictly to the physical environment and to
operations that must accord with certain standards-for example, the
requirement that tools work properly and that hazards such as fire and
floods be minimized. In contrast, "conditions of confinement" can include
the perils caused by double-bunking, the exposure to certain physical
hazards such as infectious illness, or the amenities necessary for a decent
standard of life in prison. From a tort perspective, cases about conditions
of confinement rarely make it to court, likely because the plaintiff would
have a hard time establishing that a duty of care is owed on the part of
the authorities.
The current test for a duty of care, as articulated in Cooper v Hobart,
raises a number of obstacles to the imposition of liability on government
authorities.100 The first line of inquiry is whether the duty falls within
a judicially recognized category."o' If it does, then it is not necessary to
proceed with the Anns/Cooper test. In the prison context, the argument
could be made that the duty to provide safe conditions of confinement
falls within the already existing category of the duty to provide a safe
environment, as the two are co-extensive and, at times, indistinguishable.
There is some uncertainty, however, about how strictly to construe these
pre-established categories, and courts will frequently interpret earlier
cases so narrowly that any new fact situation is characterized as requiring
by Lynn Stewart, Geoff Wilton & Colette Cousineau, Research Report R-268 (Ottawa:
Correctional Service of Canada, 2012).
100. Supra note 14.
101. Mustapha v Culligan of Canada Ltd, 2008 SCC 27, [2008] 2 SCR 114 [Mustapha].
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the imposition of a novel duty.102 Indeed, the Supreme Court has shown
a growing reluctance to impose a duty of care on government, as is
evidenced by the use of the Anns/Cooper test to negate such a duty in a
number of cases."'
If a novel duty is alleged, one then proceeds to the first stage of the
Anns/Cooper test, which requires the plaintiff to establish sufficient
relational proximity to justify the imposition of a duty. This might
require the government body to have had actual knowledge of a plaintiff's
concerns or to have been aware of a grave risk."I This would not ordinarily
be a problem in the prison context, given that the individual plaintiff is
clearly known to the defendant but proximity could be negated on policy
grounds, where a duty to an individual plaintiff would conflict with a
duty of the government to the public as a whole. In Cooper v Hobart, for
example, the Supreme Court refused to find that the Ontario Registrar
of Mortgage Brokers had been under a duty of care to investors who lost
money when the Registrar failed to revoke a broker's licence in a timely
manner on the basis that there was not sufficient proximity between the
Registrar and investors.o' The Court held that policy concerns negated
the recognition of a duty of care in that context because the Registrar
owed a duty to the public at large that would conflict with any duty to
individual investors. The prospect of conflicting duties could just as easily
negate a finding of proximity in the prison context where the plaintiff's
claim focuses on inadequate conditions of confinement. The issue of
public safety comes into play here, as correctional systems have to protect
102. The Court concluded that a doctor's duty to an unborn child (once born alive) was
novel, in spite of a substantial body of prior case law that had imposed a duty in similar
circumstances. See Paxton v Ramji, 2008 ONCA 697, 299 DLR (4th) 614, Feldman J,
leave to appeal to SCC refused, 32929 (23 April 2009). A BC trial court declined to follow
Feldman J's decision in Paxton, stating that "[w]ith what appears to be a long history of
judicial recognition of a physician's duty of care to a fetus, a duty which crystallizes upon
the live birth, an Anns analysis appears unnecessary." See Ediger vJohnston, 2009 BCSC 386
at para 206 (available on QL) (this finding of a duty was accepted by both the BC Court of
Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada).
103. Robert M Solomon et al, Cases and Materials on the Law of Torts, 8th ed (Toronto:
Carswell, 2011) at 774. See also Childs v Desormeaux, supra note 14 (social host liability);
Design Services Ltd v Canada, 2008 SCC 22, [2008] 1 SCR 737 (contract); Mustapha, supra
note 101 (products liability).
104. See Fullowka, supra note 17.
105. Supra note 14.
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the public and serve other social goals. In such circumstances, courts tend
to defer to governmental discretion and are generally loath to interfere
with the government's balancing of competing concerns. Foremost
among such concerns would likely be the extremely high financial cost
of across-the-board improvements that would be needed to improve the
conditions of confinement.
Deference of courts to government discretion is especially likely when
the allocation of resources is involved. In Just v British Columbia, the
Supreme Court held that budgetary allocations are true policy decisions
and are immune from tort liability."o6 This approach was followed in
the medical context, when parents of a baby who died in an emergency
ward sued the Ontario government for providing inadequate funding for
medical care."' The Ontario Court of Appeal found that this was a novel
duty of care and refused to recognize it, holding that the Ministry of
Health's duty to society as a whole negated a finding of proximity to
the individual plaintiffs.o' The Court also confirmed that such decisions
were immune from suit as bona fide policy decisions about funding and
hospital restructuring.0 ' Similarly, in Imperial Tobacco, the Supreme
Court indicated that decisions made at the highest level of government
about social and economic considerations were "true or core" policy
decisions that will be immune from suit.110 In light of these decisions, it
might be difficult to persuade a court to impose liability where the claim
goes beyond a concern for safety and asserts a prisoner's entitlement to
a better standard of living. Such a claim would require the allocation of
more funds to living conditions generally.
We would argue, however, that many matters related to conditions
of confinement could be characterized as operational insofar as they
involve the practical application of the basic policy decision to establish
and operate prisons. Decisions about conditions of confinement could
be seen as "manifestations of the implementation of the policy decision",
and would therefore be subject to review as operational choices about
how to implement the policy choices in favour of prisoners.' This is the
106. Supra note 16.
107. Mitchell v Ontario (2004), 71 OR (3d) 571, 188 OAC 385.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. R vlmperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2011 SCC 42 at para 95, [2011] 3 SCR 45.
111. See just v British Columbia, supra note 16 at 1246.
A. Iftene, L. Hanson & A. Manson 677
route that the British courts have taken, stating that prisoners subjected
to improper conditions of confinement could have both a public remedy
and a private action in negligence.112 This position is to some extent borne
out in the Canadian case law on environmental factors within prisons. In
Curry v Canada, the plaintiff was strip searched and placed in a dry cell
for over twenty four hours despite having already undergone x-ray and
cavity searches.' The Court stated that they were operational decisions
and procedures that amounted to negligence and were incompatible with
the duty of care imposed on the correctional system by the CCRA to
ensure that the penitentiary was safe, healthful and free of practices that
undermine a person's sense of personal dignity."' Similarly, in Mallkovich,
the Court stated that by exposing the plaintiff to second-hand cigarette
smoke while incarcerated, the government "fails in its statutory and
common-law duties of care"." 5
An interesting question is raised by the issue of double-bunking, that
is, whether negligence liability could be used to require better living
conditions in prison generally. Savard v Canada held that the double-
bunking in question was legal and justified based on its "temporary
character",1 . perhaps suggesting that if it were implemented on a more
permanent basis it might be open to challenge. This position is supported
both by CCRA regulations and by international prison guidelines, which
state:
[W]here sleeping accommodation is in individual cells or rooms, each inmate shall occupy
by night a cell or room by himself. If for special reasons, such as temporary overcrowding,
it becomes necessary for the central prison administration to make an exception from this
rule, it is not desirable to have two inmates in a cell or a room."'
112. See Rv Deputy Governor ofParkhurst Prison, [1992] 1 AC 58, [1991] All ER 733 HL
(Eng); Weldon v Home Office, [1991] 3 WLR 340 HL (Eng).
113. Curry v Canada, supra note 36.
114. Ibid at para 29.
115. Maljkovich v Canada, supra note 37 at para 2.
116. 2003 FCT 683 at para 21, 235 FTR 168.
117. First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment ofPrisoners, UN Doc A/CONF/611,
ESC Res 663 C (XXIV), UNESCOR, 1957, Supp No 1 UN Doc E/3048, amended ESC Res
2076 (LXII), UNESCOR, 1977, Supp No 1, UN Doc E/5988, ss 9-10 [Standard Minimum
Rules].
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Commissioner's Directive 550 Inmate Accommodation states that
"population management strategies must include single occupancy
when feasible and ensure that double-bunking remains a temporary
accommodation measure".' The international prison guidelines also
indicate that prisoners should not be hosted in the same dormitory if they
are unsuitable roommates and state that "all sleeping accommodation
shall meet all requirements of health, due regard being paid to climatic
conditions and particularly to cubic content of air, minimum floor space,
lighting, heating, and ventilation".
Notwithstanding the clear imposition of an internal duty by the
Commissioner's Directive, in Piche v Canada (Solicitor General) it was
nonetheless held that double-bunking was a policy decision and thus "not
open to question"120 In Williams v Canada (Commissioner of Corrections),
another case from the same era, the Court found that "there was no
evidence that there would be irreparable harm to the plaintiffs as a result
of an increase in double bunking in the institution" and held that the
administrative decision of the warden was reasonable.1 2 1 Although
Williams did not treat the issue of double-bunking as being beyond
judicial scrutiny as a policy decision, it offered nothing more on the duty
of care issue.
Even where a duty of care is found with respect to conditions of
confinement, deference on the standard of care poses an obstacle to
a finding of negligence. Courts are mindful of the difficulties that
governments may face in providing for the basic needs of all prisoners.
As noted earlier, the Federal Court in Savard held that because double-
bunking may be permissible where it is temporary, the standard of
care had been met.1 22 This minimal standard of care is also evident in
Allan v Canada (Commissioner of Corrections), which held that the
failure to provide special orthopedic footwear was not a breach of the
duty to provide recreational clothing and footwear.123 Because the duty
was "imprecisely defined by regulations", the Court said, "a reasonable
118. Corrections Service Canada, CD 550 Inmate Accommodation (Ottawa: Corrections
Service Canada, 2009-2013) available online: <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca >.
119. Standard Minimum Rules, supra note 117, ss 10-11a.
120. (1984), 13 WCB 149, 17 CCC (3d) 1 at 102 (FCTD).
121. [1993] FCJ No 646 (QL) at para 18 (TD).
122. Supra note 116.
123. (1990), 38 FTR 176, 23 ACWS (3d) 286 [cited to FTR].
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discretion on the part of administrators in meeting their duty must
be recognized and the court ought not intervene".124 This approach is
consistent with Cory J's statement in Just v British Columbia that "the
standard of care imposed upon the Crown may not be the same as that
owed by an individual" and must be balanced against a number of other
factors such as the extent of the risk, budgetary limits and availability of
personnel and equipment.125
In sum, there are substantial obstacles to a finding that conditions
of confinement will give rise to the recognition of a novel duty of care.
We have found some jurisprudential support for the claim that the
setting of conditions of confinement by CSC should be characterized as
operational decisions, given the existence of a statutory duty to provide
proper conditions of confinement. While statutory provisions are not
determinative of the standard of care and do not provide an independent
basis for a finding of liability, they may nonetheless provide useful
evidence and guidance as to the standard of care that is expected.126
This may support the imposition of a stringent standard of care, as it
clearly establishes the duty of correctional services to ensure a safe and
healthy environment, and to provide appropriate living conditions for
prisoners.12 As a general rule, however, the cases where there is no clear
duty owed rarely make it to court. Thus, aside from the above examples,
it is difficult to say whether general conditions of confinement could form
the basis for a claim in negligence. Moreover, conditions of confinement
would likely be viewed as giving rise to a novel duty and could be negated
for policy reasons. The concern here is that standards of conditions of
confinement are essentially funding decisions, and are therefore matters
of policy that are immune from suit.
124. Ibid at 181.
125. Supra note 16 at 1244.
126. Canada v Saskatchewan Wheat Pool, [1983] 1 SCR 205 at 228, 143 DLR (3d) 9.
127. These rules in turn form the basis for directives that are being daily put into practice
by correctional staff. See e.g. Corrections Service Canada, Commissioner's Directives,
CD 259: Exposure to Second Hand Smoke (Ottawa: Corrections Service Canada, 2014)
available online: <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca> (forbids smoking inside the perimeters of
a prison).
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Conclusion
In this paper we have reviewed those tort claims that made it to trial.
We did not have access to what is probably a large number of cases that
were settled outside of court. Further, the cases that have been litigated
are generally the controversial ones.
Tort claims by prisoners meet many obstacles. First, correctional staff
and institutions are held to a lower standard of care than defendants in
the general community. Under similar circumstances, a prisoner seems
to have a worse chance of succeeding than a plaintiff from the outside. In
addition, the causation analysis has been applied more rigorously in prison
tort cases and requires more than the robust and pragmatic inference
called for in Snell and Clements. Judges seem to be asking prisoners to
produce evidence that is not readily available to them and that lies mostly
in the hands of the correctional services.
Second, courts appear to be less receptive to health care-based claims
when the plaintiff is a prisoner. Arguably, prison medical staff are held to
a lower standard of medical care than medical staff that serve the wider
community. This is clearly inconsistent with legislative requirements
that the standard of health care in prison is to be equivalent to that in
the community as a whole. In addition, by applying the controversial
distinction between contractor and sub-contractor, courts are permitting
correctional institutions to escape vicarious liability for injuries suffered
by prisoners at the hands of some health care workers.
Finally, claims of novel duties are not well received by the courts
when the defendant is a government actor engaged in a public role,
particularly where there are conflicting duties at stake or where there are
resource implications. For this reason, general conditions of confinement
are unlikely to ground successful private claims even though we often see
infringements of the legal provisions.
Tort-based litigation may nonetheless benefit prisoners. The other
remedial avenues currently available to prisoners are only partially
effective. The internal grievance system is still highly bureaucratic and
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lacks clear remedies.1 2 8 The standard for judicial review of administrative
decisions is now higher than ever, with reasonableness replacing
correctness even for Charter-based claims. Tort claims and compensation
may be an effective way of drawing attention to some issues of safety
and delivery of care, 12 9 notwithstanding all of the difficulties we have
discussed.
This paper has pointed out some troubling obstacles to tort law claims
against prisons; this is amplified by the lack of lawyers specialized in this
area, the costs of litigation and the obstacles raised by courts themselves.
Tort litigation has the potential to be a tool for the protection of prisoners,
rights. This would require a firmer attitude on the part of the courts to
discourage authorities from taking a relaxed approach to rules that govern
prisoners' entitlements. Governments cannot afford the cost of defending
themselves repeatedly against civil actions, or the cost of damages when
claims for prisoner injuries, illnesses and death succeed. At some point,
128. See e.g. Correctional Service Canada, Report of External Review of Correctional
Services of Canada Offender Complaints and Grievances Process by David Mullan (Ottawa:
Correctional Service Canada; 2010). To update the Mullan Review, see Howard Sapers,
Correctional Investigator, in Senate, Standing Committee on Justice and Constitutional
Affairs, Evidence of Proceedings of the Standing Committee on Justice and Constitutional
Affairs, 41st Parl, 1st Sess, No 29 (12 December 2012).
Arising from the Mullan review, an alternative dispute resolution pilot project has
been implemented at 10 medium and maximum security institutions. The pilot is
showing some promising early results, including a high resolution rate, reduction
in the number of complaints, and more timely resolution of priority grievances.
The pilot affirms that offender complaints are best resolved at their source at the
lowest possible level and as informally as possible.
Ibid.
129. For the difficulties of prison litigation, see e.g. Brazeau v Canada, 2012 FC 1300
(available on QL). In Brazeau, the prisoner plaintiffs were self-represented and filed a
Statement of Claim challenging the general circumstances of their confinement. The
defendant brought a motion to dismiss the Statement of Claim on the basis that it did not
meet the formal and substantive requirements of pleadings. The motions judge permitted
the filing of an amended Statement of Claim and took the time to indicate what kind of
changes would be required to comply with the rules. Given the deprivation, frustration and
hopelessness disclosed by the prisoners' document, there might be good reason to expect
that the underlying facts could support a justiciable cause of action, at least an arguable one.
However, given the pleading deficiencies, one cannot be optimistic that the unrepresented
plaintiffs will proceed beyond the interlocutory stage.
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it may be prudent to improve internal prison conditions rather than to
meet these costs. Our goal in this paper has been to provide guidance
and encouragement to lawyers and researchers who might contemplate
this use of tort law as a means of enforcing legal norms and protecting
prisoners' rights.
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Property Law Culture: Public
Law, Private Preferences and the
Psychology of Expropriation
Cherie Metcalf"
Scholars divide into two main camps in the debate on the role oflaw in shaping the decisions
of individuals. Rational choice scholars argue that individual preferences are exogenous to law,
so law can be used instrumentally; realist and socio-legal scholars argue that law is culturally
contingent and must be understood in its broader context. Recent work in the theory ofreference-
dependent preferences may help unite the two schools by suggesting that while social context helps
us understand law's operation, law can also determine that context and culture. This would
complicate the relationship of law to individual decisions.
This paper provides empirical evidence to help determine whether law acts as a reference
point, by looking to a major difference in the level of property protection provided by the
constitutions of Canada and the United States. Unlike Americans, Canadians do not enjoy
constitutional protection against the expropriation ofprivate property. Except where there are
statutory restrictions, Canadian governments can expropriate land without compensating the
property owner. Therefore, according to reference point theory, attitudes towards expropriation
should differ between Americans and Canadians.
The author administered a survey to a group of Canadian students, asking them to describe
their financial and attitudinal responses to hypothetical scenarios involving government
expropriation of their property. The results were then compared to those of a similar, earlier
study in the US. If constitutions have expressive power and can act as reference pointsfor shaping
individual preferences and culture, we would expect to see a difference in the responses to the two
studies. Surprisingly, no such difference was found. Attitudes among Canadian respondents were
largely similar to those in theAmerican study. These results challenge the widespread assumption
that Americans are more attached to private property than Canadians.
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen's University. For helpful comments and
discussion, thanks to the anonymous referees, to Robert Ellickson, Stephanie Stern, Janice
Nadler and Shari Seidman Diamond, and to participants of the conferences of the Canadian
Law and Economics Association, Conference of Empirical Legal Study, and International
Society for New Institutional Economics. Thanks to Gareth Stackhouse and Reed Taubner
for helpful research assistance, financially supported by the Law Foundation of Ontario.
Thanks to Professors Ian Keay and Erik Knutsen for allowing administration of the survey
in their classes, and to the students who participated.
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B. Comparative Analysis: Canadian andAmerican Responses
(i) Financial Incentives
(ii) Attitudes Toward Moving
(iii) Attitudes Toward Government
C. Public Law and Private Preferences
Conclusion
Introduction
Scholars are divided on the role that law plays in shaping the
decisions of individuals. For more formalist legal scholars and scholars
in the rational choice school of law and economics, the preferences of
individuals are assumed to be exogenous to the law. Law can be turned
to instrumental purposes and the incentive effects of the law can be quite
readily determined. By contrast, scholars working in legal realist and
socio-legal traditions generally see the law as more culturally contingent
and hence less exogenous or deterministic in its form and effects. For these
scholars, the influence of the law can only be understood by examining
law in its broader context, attending closely to extra-legal influences on
the actors involved.
Recent work by economists potentially spans these divides by arguing
that individual preferences depend on reference points. This research
suggests that while culture and context may be important to understanding
how law operates and hence to determining its welfare effects, law may
also operate to determine social culture and context through its influence
on the construction of individual preferences and social norms, and hence
on individual and collective choices. If this reciprocity exists, it would
substantially complicate the analysis of the potential impact of legal rules.
Law may be more powerful than supposed by legal realists and some
socio-legal scholars, and less direct in its effects than generally assumed
by formalists and traditional rational choice theorists. To try to assess
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how accurately these competing views of the law reflect reality, empirical
work is needed.
It is something of a commonplace among legal scholars that
constitutional rules are declarative of the fundamental values of a
society. The rules, then, may be a strong candidate for inclusion among
the type of law that we would expect to operate as reference points for
shaping individual preferences. The design for this study exploits a major
difference between the Canadian and American constitutions. It uses a
prior, published study by Janice Nadler and Shari Seidman Diamond
(N & SD), set in the United States, as an opportunity to provide empirical
evidence on the impact of such consitutional differences on individual
preferences. In the US, the Constitution protects private property
and prevents government from expropriating it except for "public use"
and only when "just compensation" has been paid.2 Canada lacks a
constitutional constraint on government expropriation of property and
there is no constitutional requirement to pay compensation. The study
generates evidence on Canadian responses to a proposed government
expropriation of property and compares them with American responses.
While this does not allow us to determine whether there is a causal
relationship between law and individual preferences and attitudes, we can
assess whether the evidence generated is consistent with a significant link
between formal constitutional rights and the psychology of individual
and social responses. If formal constitutional rights were an important
reference point for individuals, we would expect to see a difference in
the attitudes and responses of Canadians and Americans regarding
government expropriation of their property. The evidence will be helpful
in understanding the nature of constitutional rules and their relationship
to individual preferences and culture.
The specific method I adopt in this paper is to administer a questionnaire
mirroring the questions asked by N & SD in their study of attitudes toward
expropriation in the US. This approach generates empirical evidence
that allows us to begin to probe the attitude of Canadian respondents to
1. Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman Diamond, "Eminent Domain and the Psychology of
Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective Attachment, and Taker Identity" (2008) 5:4 J
Empirical Legal Stud 713 [N & SD].
2. US Const amend V.
3. The meaning of culture is highly contested. Here I am assuming that it reflects
prevailing attitudes.
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expropriation, and also allows for comparison between the results of the
Canadian and American surveys. Both the N & SD study and mine focus
on eliciting financial and attitudinal responses to government demands to
take real property. Participants' opinions were solicited after exposure to
a short hypothetical vignette. The survey vignettes differ with respect to
how long the owner had been on the land in question (the Term variable),
and with respect to the use the government was proposing for the land (the
Use variable).' The survey solicited information from each respondent
on the compensation she would require, as an owner of the property,
to agree to move voluntarily (Compensation Incentive), as well as her
attitude toward the requirement to move and toward the appropriateness
of the government action.
The results were generated by ordered logit regression of the
Compensation Incentive on the Term and Use variables, along with a
series of controls. In addition, the distribution of the attitudinal measures
was analyzed to investigate variation in response to the Term and Use
variables. Results were generated for the Canadian survey response
data, and were then compared to the results generated from N & SD's
American data.
The results are somewhat surprising. Despite the stark difference in
the constitutional treatment of property rights in the two countries, the
data indicates that the attitudes of Canadians and Americans are very
similar. While some of the results may be consistent with the law playing
a role in shaping individual attitudes and preferences, the role appears
to be only secondary. If law operates as a reference point for individual
preferences, the results suggest we must look beyond the mere existence
of "first order" differences in constitutional structure to discover the
nature of this effect.
I. Law, Culture and Private Preferences
Understanding how law operates to produce its effects in the "real
world" is a difficult and highly contested enterprise. For many scholars,
particularly those who work in the rational choice framework of law
4. The Term on Land variable can take one of two values: a short term of two years, or
a long term of 100 years. The Use variable can take one of three possibilities: a hospital, a
shopping mall or an unspecified future use.
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and economics, the preferences of individuals are treated as "given", or
invariant to the law. These scholars focus on assessing the impact of law
through its incentive effects, primarily operative through impacts on an
individual's income or wealth. This approach has been criticized as being
too parsimonious toward individual preferences and choices, abstracting
away from important contextual and cultural drivers of behaviour and
painting too simplistic a picture of the law's effects and instrumental
potential.' At the extreme, this critique of the rational choice framework
suggests that the influence of law can only be understood by fully situating
it within the relevant social and cultural context. When taking this broader
context into account, law is arguably often a less instrumentally powerful
influence on individual behaviour.
As stated above, recent work in economics provides a possible bridge
between these divergent approaches. In a move that brings them closer
to socio-legal scholars, economists are recognizing that "culture" and
non-market institutions are vital to understanding how individuals make
5. See e.g. Gary S Becker, "Crime & Punishment: An Economic Approach" (1968) 76:2
J Pol Econ 169 (a classic example of this type of approach); Richard A Posner, Economic
Analysis ofLaw, 5th ed (New York: Aspen Law & Business, 1998) (a standard reference
text).
6. This point has been made by various scholars, including those working in socio-legal
traditions, critiquing law and economics scholarship. See e.g. Ravi Kanbur & Annelise
Riles, "Commentary 6: And Never the Twain Shall Meet? An Exchange on the Strengths
and Weaknesses of Anthropology and Economics in Analyzing the Commons" in Pranab
Bardhan & Isha Ray, eds, The Contested Commons: Conversations between Economists and
Anthropologists (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2008) 266. Scholars operating more within the
law and economics tradition have made the point as well. See e.g. Robert C Ellickson,
Order Without Law: How Neighbours Settle Disputes (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University
Press, 1991) [Ellickson, Order Without Law]; Elinor Ostrum, Governing the Commons
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990) (concerning the role of social norms
on individual behaviour and the relevance of institutions to individual choice). For the
works of "new norms" scholars, see e.g. Robert Cooter et al, discussed in Robert C
Ellickson, "Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms" (1998) 27:2 J Legal Stud 537.
7. This is only a subset of the potential modifiers for relevant context. Factors such
as historical and economic context would also be relevant to understanding how law
functions. The importance of context in fully understanding law is a prominent issue in
debates about the appropriate approach to comparative law. See e.g. William P Alford,
"On the Limits of 'Grand Theory' in Comparative Law" (1986) 61:3 Wash L Rev 945; John
C Reitz, "How to Do Comparative Law" (1998) 46:4 Am J Comp L 617.
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choices both individually and collectively. In response, scholars have
begun to model individual preferences in ways that are contextually
dependent.
One strand of literature links the preferences and choices of individuals
to their perception of how others will interpret their behaviour.
According to this literature, law can play an important role by signalling
or declaring norms of appropriate behaviour. As a social institution, law
can operate to declare a society's fundamental shared values, which feed
into individual preferences. In this way, law can help shape individual
preferences and influence the choices individuals make." Law's power
and effects are felt not only directly through financial incentives, but also
through law's reflection of social norms and values.
Another recent line of literature draws on Kahneman and Tversky's
prospect theory to propose that individual preferences are contingent on
8. See e.g. Karla Hoff & Joseph E Stiglitz, "Equilibrium Fictions: A Cognitive Approach
to Societal Rigidity" (2010) 100:2 Am Econ Rev 141. In this paper, the authors treat culture,
modeled as ideologies/belief systems, as a state variable, and emphasize the importance
of socially constructed context to perceptions, beliefs and behaviour of individuals. A
question the authors do not really interrogate in this paper is the role of law in constructing
and influencing these cultural state variables.
9. See e.g. George A Akerlof & Rachel E Kranton, "Economics and Identity" (2000) 115:3
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 715 (individual preferences constructed in terms of
identity, actions consistent with identity can enhance utility, social norms/law play role in
definition of identities, coding of actions); Eric Posner, Law and Social Norms (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000) (not via preferences directly, but social norms
operative in signaling role, determining actions in cooperative games); John A List, "Social
Preferences: Some Thoughts from the Field" (2009) 1:1 Annual Review of Economics 563
at 565 (individual preferences as a function of monetary calculations and other factors,
including moral/ethical considerations that are shaped by the strength of social norms
or legal rules that govern behaviour in a particular society); Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk,
"Psychological Foundations of Incentives" (2002) 46:4 EER 687 at 705-08 (discussing the
role of social norms and approval on individual preferences and choices, the role of law in
influencing individual beliefs about social values, and how the expressive function of law
feeds into individual choice); Oren Bar-Gill & Chaim Fershtman, "Law and Preferences"
(2004) 20:2 JL Econ & Org 331 (law influences incentives and also through evolutionary
channels influences profile of preferences in society).
10. In this literature, individuals still generally exhibit preferences consistent with
standard rational choice theory, albeit a slightly more complex version.
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the reference point from which individuals begin to assess their choices. 1
According to this theory, individuals lose more utility from a particular
action when it is framed as a loss relative to their reference point than
they gain from the same action when it is framed as a gain relative to their
reference. This "framing" effect, initiated through setting the reference
point, becomes critical to understanding individual preferences and
choices. Individuals' assessments of outcomes, and their notions of fairness
and tolerance for behaviour, are fundamentally driven by comparisons
with a relevant benchmark.12 A growing body of empirical work provides
support for reference-dependent preferences and the role of framing
effects. In this model of preferences, the initial reference point or frame
plays an important role in determining the structure of individual choice.
Despite the importance of reference points in this theory of individual
choice, it is unclear exactly how they are established. Possible choices can
11. The earliest exposition of this model of preferences is developed in Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, "Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model"
(1991) 106:4 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1039. For more recent versions of
reference-dependent preference theory, see e.g. Botond K6szegi & Matthew Rabin,
"A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences" (2006) 121:4 The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 1133; Robert Sugden, "Reference-Dependent Subjective Expected Utility"
(2003) 111:2 Journal of Economic Theory 172.
12. See e.g. Daniel Kahneman, Jack LKnetsch & Richard Thaler, "Fairness as a Constraint
on Profit Seeking: Entidements in the Market" (1986) 76:4 Am Econ Rev 728. In this
paper, the authors demonstrated that individuals held certain expectations about what it
was "fair" for firms to do (e.g., regarding changing prices, wages and employment). Firms
were expected to (and did) adhere to these norms, deviating from standard predictions.
13. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, "The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice" (1981) 211:4481 Science 453; Ian Bateman et al, "A Test of the
Theory of Reference-Dependent Preferences" (1997) 112:2 The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 479; Ernst Fehr & Lorenz Goette, "Do Workers Work More if Wages Are
High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment" (2007) 97:1 Am Econ Rev 298;
Christian Grund & Dirk Sliwka, "Reference-Dependent Preferences and the Impact
of Wage Increases on Job Satisfaction: Theory and Evidence" (2007) 163:2 Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics 313; Peter R Locke & Steven C Mann, "Daily
Income Target Effects: Evidence from a Large Sample of Professional Commodities
Traders" (2009) 12:4 Journal of Financial Markets 814. In these papers labour markets
often provide support for theories of reference-dependent preferences. But see Henry S
Farber, "Reference-Dependent Preferences and Labor Supply: The Case of New York City
Taxi Drivers" (2008) 98:3 Am Econ Rev 1069 (empirical research questioning the role of
reference-dependent preferences).
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include the status quo, "what is normal", "any stable state of affairs""
or the individual's expectations (rational or not) about what is likely to
happen."
Recent work suggests that law itself can serve as an important reference
point. Falk, Fehr & Zehnder, for example, used laboratory experiments to
determine that a minimum wage law served as an important benchmark
of "fair" wages.16 They observed that "public policies are likely to affect
behavior not only through changing incentives but also by shaping
perceptions of entitlements"." The impact of laws may be felt both
in their direct application and more diffusely through their influence
on individuals' perceptions and beliefs. Other scholars have suggested
that legal entitlements under contract may serve as a benchmark for
individuals' expectations and assessments of fairness.
If law serves as a reference point for framing individual preferences
and choices, then law could play an important role in creating culture, as
reflected in the prevailing attitudes of individuals. The claim that situating
law within culture is critical to understanding law's effects is weakened,
or substantially complicated, if law itself can serve as an important
determinant of culture. While debates over the role of law in shaping
culture are not new, the recent developments in the theory of individual
preferences offer a more precise and potentially testable hypothesis about
that role.
Both strands of scholarship on contextualizing individual preferences
suggest that law can have powerful effects, influencing individuals directly
through standard incentive effects and indirectly through the construction
and transmission of information on social values. However, the extent to
14. Kahnemann, Knetsch & Thaler, supra note 12 at 730.
15. See K6szegi & Rabin, supra note 11 at 1141 (their model relies on an individual's
probabilistic beliefs held in the recent past about outcomes, as distinct from simple use of
the status quo).
16. Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Christian Zehnder, "Fairness Perceptions and Reservation
Wages: The Behavioral Effects of Minimum Wage Laws" (2006) 121:4 The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 1347 at 1348-49. The minimum wage law, through this channel,
appeared to generate spillover effects-helping to explain "puzzles" as to why employers
would pay higher wages than required even when the law was not applicable or the
minimum wage was reduced or removed.
17. Ibid at 1351.
18. See e.g. Oliver Hart & John Moore, "Contracts as Reference Points" (2008) 123:1 The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1.
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which law truly reflects the relevant social influences is an open empirical
question. Do individuals look to the law to define the reference norms that
feed into their more contextual preferences and choices? Although some
empirical work suggests that law can operate as an important reference
point and have an important influence on individuals' attitudes,9 other
research suggests that it has a more limited role.2 0
The use of constitutional rules to protect property rights may operate
as a reference point for individual preferences in the way that Falk, Fehr &
Zehnder argue that minimum wage laws influence individual preferences.
The model of reference-dependent preferences helps to provide a more
precise way of thinking about the declarative or expressive role often
ascribed to constitutional rules.21 It suggests that constitutional rules will
operate as broader norms, with an influence on public perceptions and
on government that goes beyond their strict impact as legal rules. While
Falk, Fehr & Zehnder's work suggests that any legal rule might have
such a "baseline" effect, the constitutional status of a rule should in itself
make the rule a more potent normative touchstone. The fundamental,
entrenched nature of constitutional rules should also contribute to
reasonable expectations that they will be adhered to-at least in terms of
recent articulations of the rules.
The model of reference-dependent preferences suggests that by serving
as a common reference point, the existence of a constitutional right not
19. For work supporting the role of law as reference point, see Falk, Fehr & Zehnder,
supra note 16. See also Rafael De Tella, Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, "The
Formation of Beliefs: Evidence from the Allocation of Land Tide to Squatters" (2007)
122:1 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 209 (finding that conferral of title to property
occupied by squatters led to changes in attitudes, tilting toward more materialist and
individualist beliefs). For evidence that the form in which property entitlement was
presented linked to individual attitudes about limitations on property, see Jonathan Remy
Nash, "Framing Effects and Regulatory Choice" (2006) 82:1 Notre Dame L Rev 313.
20. For empirical work pointing to a more limited role for law, see e.g. Ellickson, Order
Without Law, supra note 6 (testing Coase's theory that individuals bargain around legal
entitlements to allocate access to resources). He found in his study of Shasta County that
the law played a limited role in settling disputes, and that individuals instead had recourse
to more particular social norms.
21. For discussion of symbolic and expressive aspects of law, see Bar-Gill & Fershtman,
supra note 9 at 332. See also Richard H Pildes, "Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social
Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism" (1998) 27:52 J Legal Stud 725
(discussing the expressive role of rights in constitutional law).
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only reflects, but also helps to shape the way individuals assess government
limitations on property. In other words, a constitutional right may help
to generate the individual attitudes that collectively shape the social
and cultural context within which the law is situated. The new work
on contextual preferences suggests a significant autonomous impact for
constitutional law. Can we find evidence of variation in attitudes that is
consistent with the hypothesis that constitutional law plays an important
role in shaping individuals' perceptions and judgments?
II. The Comparative Law of Expropriation
Examining attitudes toward the expropriation of property in Canada
and the US provides a natural setting to look for evidence of the impact of
constitutional rules. There is a significant difference in the symbolic and
declarative aspects of the legal treatment of property in the two countries.
The constitutional protection of property has a long and storied history
in the US, but a right to property was deliberately excluded from the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.22 If law operates as a reference
point or signal for social values, then we would expect a divergence at this
level to be reflected in an individual's basic attitudes.
In the United States, property rights receive constitutional protection
under both the Fifth Amendment takings clause and the due process
provisions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.2 3 Most potentially
relevant to individual attitudes toward expropriation and compensation
is the Fifth Amendment, which limits the range of purposes for which
property can be taken and imposes a requirement for compensation. It
provides a legal touchstone for the key elements of takings liability that
applies to government actors at both the federal and state level.2 4
22. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK),
1982, c 11.
23. The Fifth Amendment takings clause provides: "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation". Supra note 2. The Fourteenth Amendment
provides: "nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law". US Const amend XIV, 5 1.
24. Takings liability is imposed on the states via incorporation through the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company v Chicago, 166 US
226 (1897).
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Legal scholars have criticized the US Supreme Court's inconsistent
treatment of the Constitution's limits on government's ability to "take"
property.2 5 Much of this uncertainty surrounds the extension of the clause
to "regulatory takings" rather than direct expropriation of property.
However, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the clause
to potentially require compensation for even these indirect regulatory
encroachments on real property.2 6 The clause has also been invoked to
guard against even trivial or indirect physical encroachments on real
property.2 In contrast, the US Supreme Court has been relatively forgiving
in its scrutiny of the substantive limitation on government's power to
take property only for "public use".2 8 Despite this legal ambiguity, the
American constitutional right still seems to play a role in influencing
individual expectations about government powers. Specifically, the right
potentially helps to support an expectation that private property will be
interfered with by government only in limited circumstances and will be
25. See e.g. Bruce A Ackerman, Prvate Property and the Constitution (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977) ("a chaos of confused argument" at 8); Jed Rubenfeld, "Usings"
(1993) 102:5 Yale LJ 1077 (the takings clause is a candidate for the "doctrine-in-most-
desperate-need-of-a-principle prize" at 1081).
26. Scholars have suggested that regulatory takings challenges are rarely successful;
however, a number of prominent cases involve successful challenges to regulatory
interference with real property. See e.g. Nollan et ux v California Coastal Commission, 483
US 825 (1987); Lucas v South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 US 1003 (1992); Dolan v City of
Tigard, 512 US 374 (1994). For discussion of the general preference for land in regulatory
takings cases, see generally Richard A Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of
Eminent Domain (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1985). See also Eduardo
Moisks Peilalver, "Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership in
Regulatory Takings Law" (2004) 31:1 Ecology LQ 227. However, zoning restrictions are
somewhat of an exception to the prioritized protection of land under the US takings clause.
See Penn Central Transport Co et al v New York City et al, 438 US 104 (1978).
27. See Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATVCorp et al, 458 US 419 (1982) (installation
of cable equipment on an apartment roof is compensable as a per se encroachment on
property); United States v Causby et ux, 328 US 256 (1946).
28. Thomas W Merrill, "The Economics of Public Use" (1986) 72:1 Cornell L Rev 61. See
also Hawaii Housing Authority et al v Midkiff et al, 467 US 229 (1984); Kelo et al v City of
New London ettal, 545 US 469 (2005) [Kelo].
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accompanied by corollary compensation.29 Indeed, there has been intense
public controversy over the Supreme Court's interpretation of "public
use" to include public benefits by direct redistribution of property
between private parties.30
As a reference point, the Fifth Amendment provides a number of
potential anchors for expectations. Elements of the clause could be read
in its negative formulation to guarantee the sanctity of property rights,
potentially helping to solidify an understanding of private property
as a "keystone" right."1 Alternatively, the clause in its entirety could
serve as a reference point that legitimizes government interference with
private property for appropriate uses, but only so long as compensation
is paid.32 On either view, individuals assessing government actions will
more strongly engage the expectations generated by the constitutional
command when the state action in question touches closer to a core
understanding of property."
29. See e.g. Jennifer Nedelsky, "Should Property be Constitutionalized? A Relational and
Comparative Approach" in GE van Maanen & AJ van der Walt, eds, Property Law on the
Threshold of the 21st Century (Antwerp: Maklu, 1996) 417 at 422; Jennifer Nedelsky, Private
Property and the Limits ofAmerican Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its
Legacy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), at ch 6 (the role of the takings clause
in shaping perception of property, legitimacy of state regulation).
30. See e.g. Poletown Neighbourhood Council v City of Detroit, 304 NW (2d) 455 (Mich
1981) (involving appropriation of property for transfer to automaker for building a factory
with economic benefits for the city), rev'd County of Wayne v Hathcock, 684 NW (2d)
765 (Mich 2004); Kelo, supra note 28 (involving appropriation of property to support
redevelopment by a pharmaceutical firm, providing economic benefits).
31. See e.g. Carol M Rose, "Property as the Keystone Right?" (1996) 71:3 Notre Dame L
Rev 329 (discussing and critiquing strands of theory that prioritize property rights); Laura S
Underkuffler, "Property as Constitutional Myth: Utilities and Dangers" (2007) 92:6 Cornell
L Rev 1239 (American constitutional right contributes to the popular understanding of
property in ways not directly congruent with nuanced legal interpretation of the clause).
32. The US Supreme Court has occasionally taken this view. See e.g. Lingle, Governor of
Hawaii, etal v Chevron USA Inc, 544 US 528 at 541 (2005).
33. The "framing" of property itself is complex legally, theoretically and in "layman's"
terms. See e.g. Ackerman, supra note 25. For recent empirical evidence on the influence
that the choice of frame for property as either a "discrete asset" or "bundle of rights" had on
an individual's reactions to restrictions on property, see Nash, supra note 19.
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In Canada, although property rights are in fact relatively secure and
there is a long tradition of compensation for expropriation," there is no
constitutional limit on government's ability to take property and no
requirement to provide compensation. In fact, when Canada adopted a
suite of individual constitutional rights in 1982, the drafters vigorously
debated and eventually rejected the inclusion of a right to property,
leaving Canada as a relative "outlier" in eschewing a constitutional right
to property." This deliberate exclusion was based on a number of factors,
including concern that constitutional protection of property rights would
be too restrictive of government's ability to engage in socially desirable
regulation or redistributive policy. 6 Scholars have suggested that the
absence of property rights from the Charter was supported in order to
reserve room for governments to engage in (desirable) social and economic
regulation and redistribution of wealth.3
Canadian courts have frequently referred to the lack of constitutional
status for property rights in decisions rejecting the claims of owners that
34. See e.g. Attorney General v De Keyser's Royal Hotel Ltd, [1920] AC 508 (statutes not
to be construed to take property without compensation, unless words of statute clearly
demand otherwise). The basic presumption that the Crown will respect private property
can be traced much further back in English law, at least to the Magna Carta.
35. See David S Law & Mila Versteeg, "The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution" (2012) 87:3 NYUL Rev 762 at 773 (97% of all countries with written
constitutional documents contain a property clause).
36. Provincial governments also feared that there would be limitations imposed on
their own powers over property and civil rights through interpretation of the clause. For
discussion of this Canadian constitutional debate, see e.g. Jean McBean, "The Implications
of Entrenching Property Rights in Section 7 of the Charter of Rights" (1988) 26:3 Alta L
Rev 548; Sujit Choudhry, "The Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism" (2004)
2:1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1; Richard W Bauman, "Property Rights
in the Canadian Constitutional Context" (1992) 8:3 SAJHR 344; Alexander Alvaro, "Why
Property Rights were Excluded from the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms"
(1991) 24:2 Can J Pol Sci 309.
37. See e.g. David Schneiderman, "Property Rights, Investor Rights and Regulatory
Innovation: Comparing Constitutional Cultures in Transition" (2006) 4:2 International
Journal of Constitutional Law 371 (absence of property rights linked to space for economic
policy, expected role for the state to "facilitate markets and redistribute wealth" at 382-83).
See also Choudhry, supra note 36 at 21-27 (absence of property rights, substantive due
process in the Charter to protect governments' ability to engage in desirable socioeconomic
regulation); Bauman, supra note 36 at 355 (listing the types of schemes feared to be
vulnerable if property were included in the Charter).
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government has unjustifiably burdened them and "taken" their property.
In Mariner Real Estate Ltd et al v Nova Scotia (Attorney General), in a
detailed consideration of Canadian expropriation law in comparison with
US takings law, Cromwell JA (as he then was) underlined the contingent
nature of property rights in Canada and their inherent potential
for legislative redefinition without compensation." In the context
of these legal references, we might expect Canadians to regard their
property rights in less absolute terms, be more tolerant of government
"interference" with their property, and more receptive to redistributive
schemes than Americans. The absence of a constitutional right permitting
judicial scrutiny of government incursions on property suggests a more
positive or trusting relationship between Canadians and government and
that Canadians are less likely to view the sanctity of property rights as a
fundamental value that should constrain government's powers.40
Canada and the US provide a good opportunity to test how the
presence of a constitutional right relates to individual attitudes to
government expropriation of property. In practice, governments in both
countries would face similar legal obligations when expropriating land
for purposes similar to those in the survey vignette. For example, under
the Ontario Expropriations Act a government expropriating residential
property is required to pay compensation based on the property's market
value." The federal government and virtually all provinces have statutory
schemes governing expropriation and imposing a substantive requirement
38. See e.g. Canada Pacific Railway Co v Vancouver (City), 2006 SCC 5, [2006] 1 SCR 227
(no expropriation of property or compensation where the city restricted development of
land held by the Canadian Pacific Railway for uses other than its continued use as a no
longer economically viable rail line); Authorson v Canada (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 39,
[2003] 2 SCR 40; Mariner Real Estate Ltd et al v Nova Scotia (Attorney General), 178 NSR
(2d) 294, 549 APR 294 (CA).
39. Ibid at para 39 ("rights of ownership" defined by reference to lawful uses of land, which
may be severely restricted, including potential for stringent land use regulation); at para 42
(extensive uncompensated land use regulation is the "norm" in Canada); at paras 40-41
(Canadian courts lack the constitutional mandate to inquire into the distributive aspects of
legislative restrictions on property rights).
40. See e.g. Bauman, supra note 36 at 361 (discussing widespread skepticism about
incorporating property rights into the Charter, indication that protection of property is
not part of the "bedrock of polity").
41. RSO 1990, c E.26, ss 13(1)-(2). Similar legislation applies to government expropriation
of real property in other Canadian provinces and at the federal level.
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to pay compensation. Similarly, virtually all US states have constitutions
prohibiting direct expropriation of property without compensation.42
However, at a declarative or expressive level, the variance in constitutional
status of property rights ostensibly sends different messages in the two
countries. This makes the Canada-US comparison particularly apt for
examination of the potential preference-shaping effect of constitutional
law, and, in particular, of individual constitutional rights.
Can we find evidence that this difference in the legal structure resonates
at the level of individual attitudes toward property and the choices
individuals would make in hypothetical confrontations with government
over their property rights?
III. Empirical Approach: The Survey
In order to solicit Canadian attitudes to expropriation of property
in a way that would also allow for comparison with US attitudes and
for analysis of the link to the constitutional status of property rights, I
administered a survey that mirrors one used in the N & SD study referred
to above. That study set out to explore the psychological foundations of
popular response to the US Supreme Court's decision in Kelo v City of
New London," which elaborated on the extent of government's ability
to take property for public use under the Fifth Amendment of the US
Constitution. In Kelo, the Supreme Court confirmed New London's
authority to take residential property in a depressed area that it zoned
for redevelopment and to transfer the property to a private developer."
The decision, while unsurprising to legal observers, seemed to shock the
42. See Stewart E Sterk, "The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence"
(2004) 114:2 Yale LJ 203 at 261. The consensus approach in US takings law is to require
compensation based on the fair market value of property. See e.g. Christopher Serkin,
"The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for Regulatory Takings" (2005) 99:2
Nw UL Rev 677 at 678.
43. Supra note 28.
44. For discussion of the Kelo context, see N & SD, supra note 1 at 718-20. See also Daniel
H Cole, "Kelo's Legacy" (2007) 37:7 ELR 10540 (decision and its aftermath).
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public. Popular backlash to the decision triggered a host of legislative
efforts to amend state constitutions to limit the reach of eminent domain. 6
In their empirical work, N & SD used a survey based on a vignette similar
to Kelo to probe attitudes toward the government's power to take private
property.
For this study, I constructed a survey that matched that used by
N & SD, modifying a few details to make it appropriate for a Canadian
context.4 The survey explores financial and attitudinal responses to
proposed takings, with experimental variation in the hypothetical length
of time the individual has held the property (Term on Land: 2 years or
100 years) and in the government's proposed use of the property (Use:
children's hospital, shopping mall, or unspecified). Participants were
asked to read a version of the following short vignette and to imagine
themselves in the position of the property owners facing expropriation:
Your House
You live in a house on a plot of land. The property (house plus land) has a market value of
$200,000. The property has been in your family for [2 or 100] years.
45. This might seem to undermine any claim that constitutional law operates as a reference
point; however, it may be that these rules create expectations in a simple or heuristic way
for most individuals that do not necessarily match the more nuanced interpretations of the
constitution by legal experts. See e.g. Ackerman, supra note 25 (ordinary observers versus
experts). The results of N & SD's study confirm that individuals felt most strongly about
takings of property that were more "private" in the sense of being held by a family for
an extended period, and for uses that were further away from "public purposes", e.g., use
for commercial development as opposed to a hospital. The results are consistent with an
important heuristic, expectation-setting role for the constitutional right.
46. See Ilya Somin, "The Limits of Political Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to
Kelo" (2009) 93:6 Minn L Rev 2100; Cole, supra note 44.
47. The format for the original survey is found in N & SD, supra note 1 at 728-730. I
made very minimal changes to the survey (for example, the use of "provincial" to describe
government).
48. N & SD also varied their surveys by using two response formats for the financial
incentives required to move. The response format varied between a scaled response,
with specific dollar amounts offered as choices, and an open format that simply allowed
participants to fill in their own value. However, in part of their analysis, N & SD converted
the open responses to a scaled format, as the data generated non-normal residuals. In their
analysis, N & SD grouped the responses, controlling for format. I chose to administer my
survey in only a scale format for this initial study, using the same scale as N & SD. With
a larger sample, it would be possible to test the impact of also allowing an open format in
the Canadian survey.
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The Development
The provincial government is planning to build [either a new children's hospital, a new
shopping mall, or an unspecified use] on a large parcel of land that includes your property.
The Government's Offer
The provincial government approaches you and tells you about a property (house plus
land) not too far away that is extremely similar to your current property. An independent
appraiser tells you that the new property is valued at $200,000. The provincial government
asks you to move to this new property and agrees to cover all expenses associated with the
move.
If necessary, the provincial government can use its power to expropriate your property. In
that case the law will require you to sell your property for its fair market value ($200,000)
and pay your moving costs.
The participants were then asked, on the same scaled format used by
N & SD, to indicate the financial incentive they would require to move
voluntarily, as set out below:"
Your Response
You can try to negotiate with the government.
The government has offered to trade you the other property (worth $200,000) plus pay
all of your moving expenses. How much incentive would you need to agree to part with
your property and to move, IN ADDITION TO the new property and moving expenses?







1I am not willing to trade regardless of the incentive.
49. I did not adjust the dollar figures to reflect any exchange rate effects, but the impact of
this effect was likely very small. At the time the surveys were administered, the Canadian
and US dollars were trading almost at par value. See Bank of Canada, Can$/US$ Exchange
Rate Look-Up, online: Bank of Canada <http://www.bankofcanada.ca>. During the
period these surveys were administered, the Canadian dollar was trading at between
$0.9283 and $0.9780 USD. Adjustment for exchange rate equivalence would also not take
into account differences in property-related purchasing power.
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In addition to being asked about the financial incentive they would
demand, participants were asked a series of questions about their attitudes
toward the proposed expropriation. Participants were asked how they
felt about moving (very bad to very good), how morally right or wrong
they thought it was for the government to ask them to move (very wrong
to very right), how morally right it would be for them to move (very
wrong to very right), how beneficial or harmful the development would
be for the community (very harmful to very beneficial), and how good or
bad they thought the government's motives were (very bad to very good).
These responses were solicited on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 (for the
most negative response) to 7 (for the most positive). Participants were also
asked an open format question on what they thought government would
do with the property once acquired. These attitudinal measures and scaled
responses match those used in N & SD's survey.
I administered the survey to undergraduate and law students at
Queen's University."o The survey took approximately ten to fifteen
minutes to complete at the beginning of a regularly scheduled class and
was not announced in advance. After hearing a brief description of the
study, students were allowed to choose whether or not to participate.
They were offered no incentive (other than satisfaction of their curiosity)
to participate and were assured that their responses would be confidential.
The pool of respondents in my survey was drawn from the
undergraduate economics program and the first and second year of the
law program at Queen's University. This differs from the method of
participant recruitment used by N & SD. Their subjects were drawn
from a pool of individuals who had agreed previously to participate in
web-based research and who were offered a small financial incentive to
complete the survey, in the form of being entered into a draw for a prize."
Drawing on the information solicited about the personal characteristics
of the participants, the resulting samples varied somewhat between my
study and that of N & SD. My sample was smaller-it had a total of 155
participants, as compared to 568 in the N & SD study. The gender balance
was roughly the same-my sample was 54% female, as compared with
58% in the N & SD study. My sample population was somewhat more
ethnically diverse than that of N & SD. In my sample, 79% of participants
50. Most of these participants were Canadians (97.5%) residing in Ontario (86.5%).
51. N & SD, supra note 1 at 728.
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reported White/European ethnic origin, 2% Black, 18% Asian/South
Asian and 1% Aboriginal.52 The mean age of my sample population
was younger than that of N & SD-23 years compared with 40 years.
This is unsurprising, given the different recruitment strategy. In terms
of educational attainment, 16% reported high school as their highest
attained education, 40% reported college or university undergraduate and
44% reported graduate or professional education. This compares with
figures of 20%, 60% and 19% respectively in N & SD's sample. It is also
unsurprising that the educational level of my sample is higher than that
of N & SD, as all respondents were be enrolled in at least a university
undergraduate program.
Respondents were also asked to state whether they rented or owned
their principal residence. Not surprisingly, the majority in my sample
were renters (59%), but a fairly substantial portion indicated that they
owned their principal residence (37%).53 This seems surprisingly high for
a student group. A small number (3%) added comments to the effect that
they lived with their parents, suggesting that the ownership status of the
respondents related to the parents. Most of the respondents currently
lived in an urban environment (48%), while 2% lived in a rural setting,
23% in a small town and 27% in a suburb. This distribution is more urban
than that of N & SD and particularly differs in the very small number
of rural residents.5 1 It not entirely clear whether the respondents were
answering in terms of their own situation or that of their parents, both
in terms of their status as renters or owners and in terms of where they
lived.55 However, their responses do indicate how they saw themselves in
these respects prior to completion of the survey.
52. I used the same categories for ethnic origin in my survey as N & SD used in their
survey to preserve comparability in the measured controls. In their sample, 87% were
White/European, 5% Black, 3% Hispanic, 3% Asian and 2% Native American. Ibid at
728. I did not have any observations in the "Hispanic" ethnic origin category. A number
of respondents wrote in answers indicating that they considered themselves to be part of a
category not reflected in the choice set offered in N & SD. I have treated these as missing
observations on the ethnic origin control.
53. This compares with a larger majority of owners in the N & SD sample. In their data,
71% of respondents indicated they owned their principal residence.
54. Comparable figures in N & SD are as follows: 24% urban; 42% suburban; 16% small
town; and 19% rural.
55. The question about whether the respondent rents or owns immediately preceded
the question about whether the location was rural, small town, suburban or urban. Both
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As part of my survey, I asked about respondents' own current family
income and their parents' current family income, variables not mentioned
among the controls used by N & SD. The responses were scaled into
eight categories." Not surprisingly given the student population
surveyed, most respondents (74%) indicated that they had annual family
incomes between $0 and $20,000. However, there was considerably more
dispersion in the reported family income of parents. The median parental
income for survey respondents was in the $100,000 to $150,000 category,
exceeding the median Canadian family income.5 ' A substantial portion
of respondents indicated family incomes in the upper categories; likely
reflecting the escalating incomes of educated individuals and those at
the top of the income distribution in recent years.5 ' The relatively high
income measures produce a sample of survey respondents more likely to
own property or to have families who do, who may also place a higher
priority on the protection of property from public encroachment.
Although the use of student samples in experimental surveys is a
well-established strategy,5 ' a sample consisting of university students
is not representative of the Canadian population, and caution must be
exercised in extrapolating from it. N & SD used a different recruitment
strategy, but they also failed to generate a sample representative of their
underlying population.o The use of experimental methods nevertheless
questions asked the respondent about the status of their "primary residence" to encourage
consistency across the responses within subjects.
56. The income categories were as follows: $0-$20,000; $20,000-$40,000; $40,000-
$60,000; $60,000-$80,000; $80,000-$100,000; $100,000-$150,000; $150,000-$200,000; more
than $200,000.
57. Median family income in Ontario, the province of residence for the majority of
students surveyed (86%), was $72,734 in 2005. See 2006 Census Analysis Series, "Earnings
and Incomes of Canadians Over the Past Quarter Century, 2006 Census: Highlights" (13
October 2009), online: Statistics Canada <www.statcan.gc.ca> .A number of respondents
(around 30) chose not to answer one or both of the questions on family income, so the
summary statistics above are not entirely reflective of the sample used in the main analysis.
58. See ibid.
59. For an example of the common use of student samples in experimental, behavioural
studies in psychology, sociology and economics, see W Jonathan Cardi, Randall D Penfield
& Albert H Yoon, "Does Tort Law Deter Individuals? A Behavioral Science Study" (2012)
9:3 J Empirical Legal Stud 567 at 577 (using a student sample to draw inferences about the
deterrent effect of tort law).
60. For example, 87% of their sample is White and 19% had graduate degrees. N & SD,
supra note 1 at 728. This is not reflective of the US population as a whole: recent US
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allowed them to draw inferences about the influence of their variables
of interest, and we can similarly use the results of my survey to gain
insights into the likely influence of those variables in a Canadian setting.
In terms of uncovering the influence of constitutional status for property,
differences in the sample population I surveyed and that in N & SD also
require caution in direct comparison of the results across the two studies.
However, the comparative exercise provides a first step in investigating
the potential impact of constitutional property rights on the responses
of Canadians and Americans to expropriation. Ideally, future work will
complement this study with data more reflective of the Canadian and
American populations.
IV. Results
Implementation of the surveys provides an opportunity to investigate
how Canadian respondents react to government expropriation of
property. In particular, we can examine how financial and attitudinal
responses vary depending on the owner's relative attachment to the
property and the use that government wants to make of the property.
Little is known empirically about the potential systematic influence of
these variables. The Canadian results can subsequently be compared with
the American data from N & SD's study, as a way to begin unpacking
the potential influence of constitutional status for property on individual
preferences and attitudes toward expropriation.
A. Canadian Responses
(i) Financial Incentives
After they had read the vignette, respondents were first asked what
financial incentive, in addition to an equivalent replacement property,
would induce them to accept the government's offer and move
Census Bureau data indicate that 64% of the US population is White, and about 10% of
the census population had graduate degrees. See US Census Bureau, VotingAgePopulation
by Citizenship and Race (CVAP) (2012) online: US Census Bureau <http://www.census.
gov>; US Census Bureau, Educational Attainment in the United States: 2013 (2013) online:
US Census Bureau <http://www.census.gov >.
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voluntarily. The full distribution of responses broken down by Term on
Land is shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Financial Incentive Required to Move Voluntarily by Term on
Land
I * ni Distrib~ution of ~Repnses
Shr( irm Lo Trni All
$0 3 5 (186%(5.16%o)
$5,000 3 2 (3.253%)
$10,000 22 8 (19.30)
$50,000 32 18 (32.520)
$100,000 13 18 (203010)
$500,000 6 12 (11.681%)
$1,000,000 0 6 6(3.87%)
No Incentive Enough 0 7 (
Total 79 76 155
Percentage in each category among all responses given in brackets.
Most respondents said that some level of financial incentive would
persuade them to move voluntarily. However, a few respondents
(4.5%)-all of them in the group that received the long-term version of the
survey-indicated that they would not be willing to move at any price.61
A substantially larger number (20%) were highly resistant to the idea of
moving voluntarily, demanding at least 2.5 times the fair market value of
the property in addition to the substitute property.62 Overall, respondents
in the short term condition demanded less on average in order to be
willing to move. 6 The general resistance of respondents to being asked to
61. Roughly the same number of respondents were in the short (79) term and long (76)
term experimental conditions.
62. This group included those selecting one of the following choices from the response
scale: $500,000, $1,000,000 or "I am not willing to trade regardless of the incentive." There
were 31 respondents in this group out of 155 responses to the financial incentive questions.
63. Hypothesis of equal mean responses rejected: F(1,154)= 15.60, p<0.0001.
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move because of expropriation is apparent from the fact that a majority
demanded a substantial premium in addition to a replacement property."
Respondents generally demanded less when their property was to be
used for construction of a hospital, compared with other uses, as is shown
in Table 2.
Table 2: Financial Incentive Required to Move Voluntarily by Proposed
Use
IH1eti Dist ribut ioni of Responses
$0 3 4 1 (5.186)
$5,000 5 0 0 (3.253)
$10,000 11 11 8 30(19.35%o)
$50,000 23 12 15 (32.5206)
$100,000 10 12 9 (20.31)
$500,000 5 7 6 (11.681)
$1,000,000 3 2 1 6(3.87%)
No Incentive Enough 1 2 4 (4572)
Total 61 50 44 155
Percentage in each category among all responses given in brackets.
This is not a strongly significant result, however. When the mean
response for those in the hospital condition is compared with the mean
response for those in both alternative uses combined, there is only a
marginally significant difference (F(1, 154) = 3.08, p <0.0813). Contrasting
the hospital with the unspecified use, respondents demanded significantly
less financial incentive (F(1,154)= 4.10, p <0.0445). However, when
asked to move for a hospital as compared to a mall, there is no significant
difference in the mean financial incentive required by respondents
64. More than 50% of respondents in the short term condition demanded a premium
of $50,000 or more, while 50% of respondents in the long term condition demanded a
premium of $100,000 or more to move voluntarily.
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(F(1,154)=0.95, p<0.3320). The statistical results confirm the apparent
similarity of the responses across use. The surveys were slightly less
equally distributed across experimental conditions for the Use variable,
and there are a smaller number of respondents in each experimental
condition. Both of these factors lead to a somewhat less robust inference
about how Proposed Use influences demands for financial compensation
in order to agree to move when government asks.65 The results suggest
that the variation in compensation demands is primarily driven by the
need to move and to give up one's own property, rather than by what
sort of use the government will make of the property.
In order to more systematically investigate the relationship between
the amount of financial compensation demanded, the proposed use and the
term on the land, I performed two sets of regressions. The first contrasts
the characteristics of those respondents who were highly resistant to
moving with those who were more open to it. I divided the responses into
two categories: those who were "unwilling to sell" (which included the
20% of respondents who demanded $500,000 or more in compensation)
and those who were more willing to sell. I then ran a logistic regression,
with willingness to sell or not as the dependent variable regressed on
the Use and Term conditions and their interaction, as well as a set of
controls.66 Results for this model are given in Table 3.
65. The uneven distribution of surveys across sample conditions arises because of the
voluntary nature of the survey and the recruitment strategy. The survey is distributed to
all students with equal representation of the experimental conditions; however, students
must have the option to choose not to participate at any time during the survey, resulting
in less than equal representation in returned surveys. The randomized distribution of
surveys and relatively small difference in the return rate make it unlikely that there is
any consequent systematic link to respondent characteristics that could have significantly
influenced the results. Although the hospital condition has more responses, there are a
significant proportion of respondents in all Use categories.
66. The controls were based on information collected in the survey; however, in part
because of the nature of the responses and because of the small sample, I did not uniformly
implement categorical controls with dummies for each possible index category. I indicate
where index categories were combined in the controls that follow. Controls included are:
location (grouping rural and small town versus suburban & urban (latter both grouped and
separately)); ownership (owning versus renting); age (continuous or numerical); ethnicity
(grouped to contrast White/European versus minority); education (grouped to contrast
undergraduate or lower versus graduate/professional). I also used the financial controls
(own family income, parent family income) in a few test regressions; however, these cannot
be contrasted with results from N & SD, so they are of less interest here.
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Table 3: Logistic Regression for Unwillingness to Sell
Term 1.76 5.79 3.23(0.54) (3.15) (p<0.001)
-0.79 0.453 -1.55







Standard errors in parentheses.
The results of this first logistic regression show that those in the long
term experimental condition were more than five times as likely to be
unwilling to sell as those in the short term experimental condition. This
result is highly statistically significant (p <0.001). Those in the hospital
experimental condition were less likely to be unwilling to sell, but this
result was not significant at conventional levels of confidence (p <0. 122).69
Despite the existence of a fair amount of variation in the control
variables employed, they did not generate any significant explanatory
power.70 The results below are for simple regressions of the bivariate
67. Tests for single coefficient restrictions in logistic models are calculated as t-statistics,
compared to the standard normal distribution, while more complex coefficient restrictions
may be tested with Wald, LR or LM tests. For discussion of hypothesis testing in bivariate
choice models, see William H Greene & David A Hensher, "Modeling Ordered Choices"
(2009) at 42, online: New York University <http://people.stern.nyu.edu/wgreene > .
68. The sample size in the logistic regressions is reduced, as some observations were
dropped due to missing information on control variables, such as ethnicity, ownership
status or location. Only observations for which there was a complete set of controls were
used in the regression analysis.
69. The reported results are for the regression treating hospital use versus other uses
grouped. There is no significant effect of Use when the alternative format of dummies for
each use is employed (omitting "unspecified").
70. The results presented are from simple regressions of the bivariate dependent variable
on the Use and Term dummies. Alternative specifications including the controls produced
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dependent variable on the Term and Use experimental conditions.1 This
is interesting in itself, as it suggests that the responses were consistent
across controls for residence location, ownership category and ethnicity.72
The most consistent result was the link between long-term occupation
of the vignette property and unwillingness to sell. This effect was
large, statistically significant and robust across all specifications. These
results appear to confirm that attachment to the property (reflected in
length of occupation) was a much more important driver of variation in
compensation demanded than the proposed use of the property.
The second set of regressions focused on the full set of ordered responses
for the financial incentive required for individuals to agree to move. The
level of financial compensation was coded in eight ordered categories,
with 1= $0 and 8 ="not willing to trade regardless of incentive". I then
ran ordered logit regressions of this dependent variable on the controls,
the Term and Use variables, and their interaction. Results are presented
below in Table 4.
The results from the ordered logit regressions on the full menu of
financial incentives are similar to those for the previous model. As before,
the most consistent result is the significant effect of the Term condition
on the choice of financial incentive by respondents when asked to move.
The Term variable was highly statistically significant in all specifications.
The Use variable was marginally significant (p <0.081) in the restricted
model that excludes the control variables: Model 2 in Table 4. The
hypothesis that the controls are jointly insignificant cannot be rejected.
However, there is some evidence of explanatory power in the controls,
as the ethnicity variable in particular was marginally significant
(p<0.090)." In alternative specifications that include control variables,
similar results; however, I was not able to reject the hypothesis that the controls were
jointly insignificant (LR Test: x = 6.61, p<0.3586).
71. The interaction variable was insignificant in alternative specifications in which it was
included.
72. There was more variation in these controls; other insignificant controls including Age
and Education may have lacked sufficient variation to produce measurable effects.
73. LR test: X(= 7.63, p <0. 2666.
74. This result was robust across several alternative specifications, including those with
multiple dummies for the Use variable and a version of the model adding controls for
parental income. In the alternative specifications the significance on the ethnicity variable
was at least as high as the reported significance above.
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the Use variable was no longer significant. The Use variables also became
insignificant when the alternatives (hospital and mall) are considered
separately (omitting the unspecified Use). The interaction between Use
and Term was also insignificant.
Table 4: Ordered Logit Regression for Financial Incentive to Move
Model 1: W itli Comitrns Model 2: No C itrols
(P ~let N, '111e () ue)
Term 1.25 3.70 1.17 3.56(0.34) (0.000) (0.33) (0.000)
Use -0.50 -1.56 -0.55 -1.74(0.32) (0.119) (0.31) (0.081)
-0.40 -1.03Location (0.39) (0.304)
Ownership -0.30 -0.96(0.31) (0.338)
0.05 0.87
Age (0.06) (0.384)
-0.07 -0.21Gender (0.33) (0.831)
0.68 1.69Ethnicity(0.40) (0.090)
Education -0.56 -1.44(0.39) (0.151)
Log Likelihood -223.43 -227.24
2 23.68 16.05
(p <0.0026) (p <0.0003)
N 133 133
Standard errors for coefficients in parentheses. P values for Z-stats in parentheses.
Further calculation is needed to uncover the marginal effects of changes
in the independent variables of interest, as estimated coefficients in ordered
logit regressions do not have direct, intuitive interpretations in terms of
75. Tests for single coefficient restrictions in ordered logistic models calculate a Wald
statistic in the form of a z-statistic that is compared with critical values from the standard
normal distribution, while more complex coefficient restrictions may be tested with Wald,
LR or LM tests, distributed X1. For discussion of hypothesis testing in ordered logit models,
see Greene & Hensher, supra note 67 at 124-25.
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the relationship between the independent and dependent variables.6 The
calculated marginal effects, by definition, would shift the distribution of
probability between the available categories." The marginal effects of
moving between the short term and long term experimental conditions,
as well as moving from the combined alternative uses to the hospital, are
given in Table 5, below.
Table 5: Marginal Effects of Term & Use on Choice of Financial Incentive
Model t: WXith Controls lodl 2: No Controls
Incentix e
Pr(Jncent) d~er/ dAr/dUse PrIct dPr/ f /ds
-0.048 0.020 -0.049 0.024
$0 0.039 (p<0.01 8) (p<0.179) 0.044 (0.019) (p<0.141)
$5,000 0.029 -0.033 0.014 0.032 -0.033 0.016
(p<0.03 9 ) (p<0.201) (p<0.04
2 ) (p<0.166)
-0.153 0.064 -0.143 0.070
$10,000 0.189 (p<0.000) (p<0.128) 0195 (p<0.001) (p<0.090)
$50,000 0.351 -0.058 0.021 0.340 -0.048 0.019
(p<0.090) (p<0.228) (p<0.118) (p<0.245)
0.115 -0.051 0.105 -0.054$100,000 0.227 (p<0.002 ) (p<0.136) 0.221 (p<0.003) (p<0.09 9 )
0.107 -0.042 0.099 -0.045$500,000 0.109 (p< 0.004) (p< 0.129) 0.109 (p< 0.004) (p< 0.095)
$1,000,000 0.026 0.031 -0.012 0.030 -0.013(p<0.06 8) (p<0.202) 0.027 (p<0.06 9 ) (p<0.170)
No Incentive 0.039 -0.014 0.039 -0.017
Enough 0.030 (p<0.043) (p<0.182) 0.032 (p<0.045) (p<0.148)
Pr(Incent)= probability incentive choice falls in the corresponding category, dPr/dTerm
& dPr/dUse are changes in probability of category from discrete change in the associated
dummy. P values for estimated marginal effects in brackets, effects significant at 10% or
better in bold.
76. See e.g. ibid at 119-21.
77. See ibid at 120.
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The marginal effect of moving from short-term to long-term occupancy
of the vignette property is similar for both models. The effect is to shift
the distribution of financial incentive responses toward the higher values.
As seen in Table 5, the likelihood of a choice among all four categories
from $0 to $50,000 declines, with the largest absolute predicted decline
in the probability of an individual selecting the $10,000 category. The
likelihood of a choice among the upper set of incentives increases (ranging
from $100,000 to "no incentive enough"). There are large, significant
predicted marginal increases in the probability of an individual selecting
either $100,000 or $500,000 as the preferred compensation. While the
shift between short and long term also increases the predicted probability
that individuals will demand very high compensation or be completely
unwilling to move, these effects are smaller in absolute terms and not as
statistically significant.
The marginal effect of designating the hospital use relative to the
alternative use was also similar across models. The presence of the
hospital condition is associated with a predicted shift in the distribution
of incentive responses toward the lower values; however, the predicted
effects are often not statistically significant. The predicted marginal effects
of introducing the hospital use are smaller in magnitude than the effect
of the Term on Land condition on the incentive responses. The largest
response is found in the predicted increase in the probability that the
$10,000 category is chosen (6.4% in Model 1; 7% in Model 2). This effect
is marginally significant in Model 2. The other substantial effects are the
declines in the probability that the $100,000 and $500,000 categories are
selected when the hospital condition is present-declines in the order of
5% and 4% respectively. These effects are also marginally significant in
Model 2.
The analysis of the marginal effects indicates a relatively consistent
relationship between the variables of interest and the compensation
demands. The long term experimental condition was associated with
higher demands for compensation in the form of a shift from moderate
demands for compensation to high, but not extreme, demands for
compensation. The marginal impact of the Use condition is more muted.
The introduction of a clearly "public use" condition (the hospital) shifted
the demand for compensation downward, increasing the probability of
choice in the moderate range and reducing the likelihood of demands in the
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higher categories. However, the effect is not robust across models and the
effects are often statistically insignificant. Overall, the marginal analysis
appears to confirm that individuals' demands for financial compensation
in the face of expropriation are most robustly influenced by the nature
of their attachment to the property, as reflected in the term they have
hypothetically been in occupation. While there is some evidence that the
use government proposes for the property has an effect on compensation,
it is much less systematically significant.
(ii) Attitudinal Responses
In addition to the questions about the level of financial incentive
needed to induce a voluntary move, the survey solicited attitudinal
responses from respondents about the proposed move on a 7-point scale.
Below, I discuss the results for these attitudinal measures, breaking the
analysis down by Term and Proposed Use. As in the N & SD study, I
have grouped analysis of the individuals' attitudes toward the move and
attitudes about government.
The mean responses for individuals by Term are given in Table 6.8
Considering the responses together, on average, none of the respondents
felt particularly good about moving, as the mean falls between the "bad"
and "somewhat bad" categories. However, on average, respondents were
neutral about whether it was morally right for them to move. On average,
they saw moving as slightly beneficial to the community, with average
responses falling between "neutral" and "somewhat beneficial". Tracking
this result, respondents also felt government was marginally influenced
by good motives, the mean response falling again between the "neutral"
and "somewhat good" categories. However, on average, respondents
considered it slightly morally wrong for the government to have asked
them to move, with the mean response falling between "somewhat
wrong" and "neutral".
Comparing these attitudinal measures across the Term variable
disclosed no statistically significant differences. It did not seem to matter
how long the respondents in the scenario had held the land; they responded
similarly to the attitudinal questions. This is evident from the F-statistics
78. Note that these responses are conditional on sorting by Term only, and are not
conditioned on the Proposed Use.
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for the null that the attitudinal means for short term and long term
responses were equal, as set out in Table 6. None of these test statistics
imply rejection of the null at any conventional level of significance.
Table 6: Mean Responses for Attitude Measures by Term on Land
QetolMeal F-Stat
Short I iIngTerm pS- pl
Attitude Toward 2.87 2.65 F(1,152)= 1.44
Moving (1.05) (1.24) P<0.2312
I Am Morally Right 4.08 3.87 F(1,153)= 1.14
if I Move (1.21) (1.20) P<0.2863
Moving Will Benefit 4.73 4.51 F(1,154)=0.99
Community (1.44) (1.32) P<0.3221
Government Morally 3.47 3.32 F(1,154)=0.45
Right (1.44) (1.38) P<0.5013
Government Motives 4.42 4.47 F(1,154) 0.07(1.46) (1.24) P <0.7980
*Standard errors in parentheses.
Comparing the attitudinal measures across the Proposed Use variable
disclosed significantly more variation in the average responses, as seen in
Table 7, below. Respondents still felt slightly negative about moving, and
this response is different in a marginally significantly way across proposed
uses. A comparison of the mean response for the hospital use with the
alternatives of a mall and an unspecified use grouped together produced a
marginally significant difference (p <0.0672). This significance is driven
by the lower mean response for respondents confronting expropriation
with no proposed use specified. Comparing the mean response of those
who faced expropriation for a hospital with the mean response of those
whose property was taken to build a mall, disclosed no statistically
significant difference in the attitude toward moving. However, there is
a much more marked difference when contrasting the mean responses
to whether the individual is morally right to move, and to whether
moving will benefit the community across the proposed uses. The use
of the property for a hospital strongly increases the mean response for
both. On average, respondents felt that they were morally somewhere
between "neutral" and "somewhat right" to move, and that the use will
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be between "somewhat beneficial" and "beneficial" to the community
when the property is taken for a hospital. In contrast, the other uses
generated responses that are neutral to marginally negative. Again, it is
interesting that on these measures the sample means for the mall use are
more positive than those where no use is specified. There are strongly
statistically significant differences between the means for hospital use
compared to the other uses combined, and when contrasting the specific
uses of a hospital with a mall, as set out below in Table 7.
Table 7: Mean Responses for Attitude Measures by Proposed Use
QusinPropsed Use Fsa F-stat
Hospitl l L I'cifdl pilO pi 1
Attitude Toward 2.98 2.68 2.56 F(1,152)= 3.40 F(1,152)= 1.91
Moving (1.24) (1.06) (1.10) P< 0.0672 P< 0.1687
I Am Morally 4.46 3.78 3.52 F(1,153)= 20.76 F(1,153)= 11.20
Right if I Move (0.91) (1.18) (1.39) P< 0.0000 P< 0.0010
Moving 5.66 4.04 3.86 F(1,154)= 88.01 F(1,154)= 50.51Will Benefit (1.08) (1.28) (0.95) P< 0.0000 P< 0.0000
Community
Government 3.84 3.18 3.02 F(1,154)= 10.68 F(1,154)= 7.03
Morally Right (1.34) (1.26) (1.52) P< 0.0013 P< 0.0088
Government 5.16 3.74 4.25 F(1,154)= 38.85 F(1,154)= 37.63
Motives (1.00) (1.37) (1.31) P< 0.0000 P< 0.0000
*Standard errors in parentheses. Statistically significant test statistics indicated in bold.
When we examine the respondents' attitudes toward government,
again we see that the proposed use makes a significant difference to the
response. For all proposed uses, respondents feel marginally negative
about the expropriation; however, the mean for the hospital use is closest
to "neutral" while the other mean responses are closer to the view that
it is "slightly wrong" for the government to ask for the property. The
means are significantly different, whether comparing the hospital to the
other uses grouped (p <0.0013) or comparing the hospital to the mall
directly (p <0.0088). Respondents facing possible expropriation for the
hospital project also ascribed more positive motives to the government
on average, rating them at slightly better than "somewhat good". In
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contrast, the mean responses for those whose property was to be taken
for the mall fell between "somewhat bad" and "neutral", while those for
unspecified uses were roughly neutral about the government's motives.
The difference between the positive mean response of hospital use and
other uses grouped was significant (p < 0.0000), as was hospital versus
mall (p <0.0000).
Based on the sample data, the nature of the proposed use was more
important than the length of time on the property in explaining the
variation in respondents' attitudes. The latter did not drive significant
variation in participants' attitudes toward the proposed expropriation.
In general, the sample respondents held neutral to negative attitudes
toward government expropriation of the property, except where the
proposed use was a hospital-an evocative "public use" of the property.
Even then, respondents were lukewarm toward moving. However,
the hospital condition was associated with significantly more positive
attitudes, indicating that moving was seen as morally right and as being
beneficial to the community. The hospital use also produced significantly
more positive assessments of the legitimacy of the government demand
for the property, and particularly of government's motives. While the
respondents did not appear to translate the influence of these attitudes
into variation in the compensation demanded, the nature of the proposed
use of the property does appear to have affected their attitudes toward
expropriation, particularly their assessment of the government behaviour.
B. Comparative Analysis: Canadian andAmerican Responses
To probe the question of whether the existence of a constitutional right
to property influences individual responses to government expropriation,
I will compare the Canadian survey results with those of the N & SD
study set in the US. As noted above, this comparative exercise must be
approached with caution. The nature of the experimental design does not
allow for a test of the potential causal effect of constitutional property
law; at most we can examine the comparative data to see if it is consistent
with the hypothesis that constitutional rights serve as a reference point
for individuals. In addition, although my survey design for the Canadian
data follows N & SD's work as closely as possible, there are some
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methodological differences." Neither the Canadian nor American sample
is fully representative of the underlying populations, and there were
differences in the recruitment methods of the two samples and in their
characteristics. 0 This limits the ability to draw generalizable conclusions
from these studies about attitudes toward expropriation in the two
countries. Nevertheless, keeping these caveats in mind, I will examine the
comparative data to see whether any significant differences are apparent
between the attitudes of the Canadian and American respondents when
faced with similar expropriation scenarios.
(i) Financial Incentives
There are strong similarities between the Canadian and American
responses on the financial incentives required to move.82 A majority
of both sets of respondents expressed a willingness to move at some
level of compensation. Only a small minority said that no amount of
compensation could induce them to give up the property-a minority
that was even smaller in the Canadian sample (4.5%) than in the American
sample (9.4%). In both samples, respondents in the long term experimental
condition were much more likely to be in this minority. In fact, in the
Canadian sample, all of those who would have refused to sell were in the
long term condition. This difference provides some indication that the
rate of "private property extremism" may be higher in the US, although
79. In some ways the designs are not identical. For example, in this study I did not use
separate questions to ask whether government was motivated by good motives and bad
motives, but asked a single question asking for a global assessment of government's motives.
I thought this would be a more straightforward way to approach individuals' assessments of
government motives. It is similar to the approach in N & SD, but a "net" approach to their
questions. The 7-point scale in N & SD for assessing whether government is motivated
by good or bad motives ranges from 1= "not at all" to 7= "very much". N & SD, supra
note 1 at 730. In the analysis below, I assume that a value of 4 is equivalent to respondent
neutrality on the question of government motives for both of N & SD's questions.
80. Here again, the inclusion of control variables helps to mitigate this problem to a
certain degree.
81. This concern is somewhat blunted by the insignificance of control variables/
robustness of the general conclusions across controls that relate to the representativeness
of the sample (e.g., age, ethnicity, education, income, owner/renter status, location, etc.)
82. The results for the financial component of the US study are set out in N & SD, supra
note 1 at 731-34.
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the small sample size for Canadian respondents in this category makes it
difficult to draw any robust inference. In both samples, those in the long
term condition demanded significantly more compensation than those
in short-term occupancy. In contrast, the variation in the Use variables
had no consistent significant effect on the financial incentives required by
respondents in either sample.
The results from the logit regressions on the Canadian and American
data confirm the broad outlines above. In analyzing the group of
highly resistant sellers in both samples, the main result is the significant
influence of the Term variable: those in the long-term occupancy
condition were significantly more likely to refuse or be very unwilling
to sell their property. In contrast, the Use variable had little or no effect.
While the hospital use had some marginal significance in Canada, this
was not robust across specifications and it showed no significant effect
in the American data. Similarly, in regressions including the full range
of financial incentives, the long term condition led to higher demands
for compensation in both samples. This result is significant and robust
across specifications in both the Canadian and American data. The Use
variable worked in a similar direction in both studies, with respondents
demanding lower compensation when the proposed use was a hospital.
However, in neither case were the effects statistically reliable or robust
across specifications.
Despite the very different constitutional protection of property
rights, Canadians and Americans appear to behave in a similar manner
when confronted with a hypothetical expropriation scenario. For both
Canadians and Americans, the most influential variable explaining
demands for compensation appears to be how long the respondent
has owned the property. In neither sample did respondents appear to
systematically and reliably calibrate their demands for compensation on
the basis of the use that the government proposed for the property.
(ii) Attitudes Toward Moving
In contrast, there was more variability in how the Canadian and
American respondents felt about the expropriation scenarios. A major
qualitative difference is found in the respective influence of the Term
variable. This is apparent in Table 8, below, giving mean responses by
C. Metcalf 719
Term in the Canadian and American samples. In the American data,
the Term variable continues to exert a strong and statistically robust
influence on attitudes. In the American experiments, those in long-term
occupancy felt more negatively about moving, and felt that it was both
less moral for them to move and less beneficial to the community. They
also considered it less moral for government to ask them to move, and
were more inclined to attribute bad motives to government." For the
Canadian sample, in contrast, the results on the attitude measures are not
significantly influenced by the Term variable. The Canadian respondents
appear to have felt the same about the proposed takings whether they
were in short- or long-term occupancy of the property.
Table 8: Attitude Toward Moving by Term on Land in Canada & US
Q u s i nC nS h o r t T e r m u sC a L o n g T r n i u
Attitude Toward 2.87 3.91 2.65 3.38
Moving (1.05) (1.65) (1.24) (1.66)
I Am Morally Right 4.08 4.66 3.87 4.38
if I Move (1.21) (1.50) (1.20) (1.50)
Moving Will Benefit 4.73 4.52 4.51 4.30
Community (1.44) (1.42) (1.32) (1.35)
*Sample mean responses. Standard errors of responses in parentheses. Statistically
significant differences in bold.
In both the Canadian and American samples, respondents' attitudes,
in contrast with their financial demands, do appear to be significantly
influenced by the proposed use of the property, as seen in Table 9, below.
In both countries, when the proposed use was the hospital respondents
felt better about moving, felt that it was more morally right, and that it
would be more beneficial to the community. Similarly, when the hospital
was the proposed use respondents in both countries felt that government
was more morally right and more influenced by good motives.
83. The US attitudinal results shown in Tables 8-11 are set out and discussed in N & SD,
supra note 1 at 734-36.
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Table 9: Attitude Toward Moving by Proposed Use in Canada & US
Attitude Toward 2.98 3.81 2.68 3.60 2.56 3.54
Moving (1.24) (1.67) (1.06) (1.63) (1.10) (1.71)
I Am Morally Right 4.46 4.80 3.78 4.43 3.52 4.36
if I Move (0.91) (1.41) (1.18) (1.42) (1.39) (1.64)
Moving Will Benefit 5.66 5.25 4.04 3.97 3.86 4.05
Community (1.08) (1.34) (1.28) (1.28) (0.95) (1.19)
*Sample mean responses. Standard errors of responses in parentheses. Statistically
significant difference in bold.
Overall, the Canadian respondents appear to have felt worse about the
proposed expropriations than their American counterparts, as is apparent
from Tables 8 and 9. Both the Canadian and American respondents had
worse than neutral feelings about moving, but the Canadian responses
were significantly less favourable than the US responses.14 This result is
robust whether we compare attitudes across short term and long term
conditions in the Canadian and American samples15 or attitudes across
Proposed Use categories. 6 The Canadians were also less convinced than
the Americans that it was morally right for them to move. Again, this result
84. I am assuming comparability of the seven point attitudinal scales used in N & SD
with those used in my survey. In this section, in order to test whether there is a significant
difference between the Canadian and US means, I have used simple t-tests for the mean
of a single distribution (the Canadian distribution) and tested the null hypothesis that the
mean of the Canadian distribution is equal to that of the US (as reported in N & SD),
primarily against a two-tailed alternative of unequal means, but occasionally against a one-
tailed alternative.
85. Test for means for attitude toward moving by Term condition, Ho Pc_= ps: short
term: t7)= -8.73 (p<0.0000); long term: t7 = -5.0579 (p<0.0000).
86. Test for means for attitude toward moving by Use condition, H,: Pc= ps: hospital:
t(9)= -5.16 (p <0.0000); mall: t( 9)= -5.75 (p<0.0000); unspecified: t(= -6.22 (p<0.0000).
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is robust across comparison by Term" and by Proposed Use." However,
this result is not due to any feeling by Canadian respondents that their
move would be less beneficial for the community; to the extent that there
were any significant differences in this regard, Canadian respondents felt
that their move would be more beneficial to the community."
(iii) Attitudes Toward Government
Somewhat surprisingly, the more negative feelings expressed by the
Canadian respondents also cannot be linked to more negative attitudes
toward the government's moral justification in asking for the property,
or more negative perceptions of its motives. The means for attitudinal
questions focused on government are summarized below in Table 10 by
Term and in Table 11 by Use.
In general, both Canadian and American respondents appear to
have felt that it was mildly immoral for government to ask them to
give up their property. In the US sample, this attitude was stronger
among respondents in long-term occupancy, but that was not true for
the Canadian sample."0 There was no significant difference between the
samples in the attitude of those in short-term occupancy toward the
government's moral justification in asking for the property, nor was there
any significant difference between them with respect to the government's
moral justification for demanding their property for a hospital or for an
87. Test for means for moral to move by Term condition, H,: Pc= As : short term:
t77 = -4.24 (p <0.0001); long term: t( = -3.70 (p<0.0004).
88. Test for means for moral to move by Use condition, H.: Pc= ps : hospital: t(,)
-2.94 (p<0.0046); mall: t( = -3.89 (p<0.0003); unspecified: t 3)= -4.00 (p<0.0002).
89. There is a marginally significant difference when testing the mean attitudes to
community harm or benefit across term of occupancy, against the one-tailed alternative
of a higher Canadian mean (short term: t(78 =1.32 (p<0.0962); long term: t(75) =1.41
(p <0.0819)). There is a significant difference in the mean attitude to community harm
or benefit when examining the hospital use, with Canadians finding it more beneficial
(hospital: t,) =2.94 (p<0.0023-one tailed)). In contrast, when examining the attitude
toward community harm or benefit across the unspecified or mall categories, there is no
significant difference in mean response between Canadians and Americans (either one- or
two-tailed tests).
90. Test for equal means to question of whether government moral to ask across Canada
and US, by Term condition, H.: A = ps: short term: t( = 0.546 (p <0.587); long term:
t(5= 2.124 (p<0.0369-two tail; p<0.0185-one tail, Can> US).
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unspecified Use condition, but Canadians appear to have been somewhat
less negative in that regard than Americans when the property was to be
used for a mall."
Table 10: Attitude Toward Government by Term on Land in Canada &
Us
ill S 1rt Te 1m .CLo Term u
Government Morally 3.47 3.38 3.32 2.98
Right (1.44) (1.61) (1.38) (1.62)
Government Motives 4.42 4.47
(Car) (1.46) (1.24)
Government Good 4.69 4.15
Motives (US) (1.45) (1.68)
Government Bad 3.42 3.82
Motives (US) (1.59) (1.63)
*Sample mean responses. Standard errors of responses in parentheses. Statistically
significant differences in bold.
Turning to comparative attitudes about government motives, a
similar picture emerges. 92 In general, in both Canada and the US, survey
respondents felt neutral to slightly positive about them. Again, in the
US those in long-term occupancy of their property had slightly more
negative feelings, so they were more inclined to attribute "bad" motives
to the government. As between the two samples, the Canadians who
were in long-term occupancy on average attributed "good" motives to
government to a significantly greater extent than the Americans who
91. Test for equal means for to question of whether government moral to ask across
Canada and US, by Use condition, H . ps: hospital: t(o)= 0.733 (p<0.4666); mall:
t9) 2.307 (p<0.0253-two tailed; p<0.0127-one tailed, Can>US); unspecified: t =
-0.250 (p<0.8035).
92. Comparison on this variable is complicated somewhat by the different way in which
attitudes about government motives where solicited. Where the net attitude toward
government is positive in Canada, I have assumed the primary comparison of interest is
between the Canadian measure and the "good" motives measure for the US data. When
the Canadian net mean is negative, I have focused on the similarity with "bad" motives in
the US.
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were in long-term occupancy, but that was not true of those in short-
term occupancy."
Table 11: Attitude Toward Government by Proposed Use in Canada &
Us
Proposcd Use,
~Call us: Cal) J C us cl s!
Government Morally 3.84 3.71 3.18 2.77 3.02 3.08
Right (1.34) (1.67) (1.26) (1.48) (1.52) (1.59)
Government Motives 5.16 3.74 4.25
(Car) (1.00) (1.37) (1.31)
Government Good 5.26 4.12 3.95
Motives (US) (1.39) (1.48) (1.56)
Government Bad 3.01 3.93 3.90
Motives (US) (1.58) (1.55) (1.57)
*Sample mean responses. Standard errors of responses in parentheses. Statistically
significant differences in bold.
Both the Canadian and American respondents were sensitive to
the proposed use in their attitudes about government motives. In both
samples, the hospital use was associated with a substantially higher mean
attribution of good motives to government than the other two uses.
However, there was no significant difference between the level of "good"
motivations assessed by Canadians and Americans when the proposed use
was a hospital.9 4 The Canadians and Americans were roughly neutral in
their responses to government motivations for the other two proposed
uses (mall or unspecified use). The mean Canadian response for the mall
use is slightly negative about government motivations. This Canadian
mean response is statistically indistinguishable from the American mean
93. Test for equal means comparing motives question in Canada with "good" motives
mean in US by Term, Ho fc,_ = s: short term: t(7 = -1.653 (p<0.1024); long term: t 5 )=
2.260 (p<0.0267-two tail; p<0.0134-one tail, Can>US).
94. Test for equal means comparing motives question in Canada with "good" motives
mean in US, by Use condition, H .: = hospital: to) = -0.748 (p<0.4574).
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for "bad" motives in the mall condition." The mean Canadian response in
the unspecified condition is weakly positive about government motives.
This mean response is statistically marginally higher than that for the US
"good" motives response.6 Direct comparison of the results is slightly
complicated because of the different approach used to assess respondent
attitudes toward government motives. Overall, the responses across the
Canadian and US surveys indicate a remarkable degree of consistency
in how respondents attribute the level of good or bad motivation to
government in the vignettes.
C. Public Law and Private Preferences
The broad objective of this survey experiment was to provide evidence
to help assess the theory that law plays an important role as a reference
point for individual preferences. There is a stark difference between the
Canadian and American approaches to property at the level of individual
constitutional rights-perhaps the most salient form of public law
protection. The US constitutionally limits the ability of government
to encroach on individual property rights, but Canada has no such
restriction, and an individual right to property was deliberately excluded
from the Charter. Whether we see constitutional law as constituting the
fundamental values held by individuals in a society or as reflecting those
values, we would expect to find significant differences in how Canadians
and Americans respond to proposed government expropriation of
property. For the most part, the results generated in this survey, when
compared to those reported in a sample of American respondents in the
N & SD study, do not point to any such divergence, but instead to strong
similarity.
Canadian and American respondents were similar in terms of their
demands for financial compensation in the face of proposed expropriation.
95. Test for equal means comparing motives question in Canada with "bad" motives mean
in US, by Use condition, H . As : mall: t(49)= -0.983 (p<0.3307-two tailed). The
Canadian response is significantly distinguishable, if the Canadian mean is compared with
the US mean response for "good" motives: Ho fc= ps : mall: t(9)= 1.965 (p<0.0551-
two tailed; p<0.0275-one tailed, Can<US).
96. Test for equal means comparing motives question in Canada for unspecified use with
"good" motives mean in US, Ho: = unspecified: t ( 3 )= 1.514 (p<0.1372-two
tailed; p<0.0686-two tailed, Can>US).
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The vast majority of respondents demanded some amount of compensation
over and above the provision of a substitute property, with the amount
demanded being tied most significantly to the length of occupancy of the
land. Neither the Americans nor the Canadians appeared to alter their
financial demands in response to the use proposed by the government
for their property. For both, the degree of subjective attachment to the
property (as reflected in the length of occupancy) was the variable that
best explained the demand for compensation. These results do not appear
to vary with the public law structure that governs expropriation, but to
suggest a more universal approach to property rights that is at odds with
the stark difference in their constitutional status in Canada and the US.
Nor do the attitudinal measures which were surveyed provide strong
support for the theory that public law in the form of an individual
constitutional right to property significantly determines or reflects
individual preferences. Both the Canadian and American respondents
were lukewarm at best when faced with government demands for their
property. However, for both surveys, these more or less negative attitudes
were moderated when the proposed use was a hospital. Importantly for
the hypothesis that constitutional differences matter, the data offered
no strong evidence of differences in attitudes toward government as
between Canada and the US, but instead showed that for the most part,
those attitudes were very similar. Some marginal differences emerged
which reflect qualitatively different responses-for example, attitudes
of the Canadian respondents did not appear to vary with the degree of
subjective attachment, as reflected in the Term variable, but there is
no obvious link between this difference and a theory of constitutional
rights as reference points. The Canadian and American respondents
reacted similarly to variation in the purpose of the government taking.
They were indistinguishably more positive about government's moral
justification for that action when the purpose was building a hospital than
for other purposes. Their responses were also indistinguishable in the
extent to which they attributed good motives to a government making an
expropriation demand. Both Canadian and American respondents found
government takings for unspecified uses or for commercial development (a
mall) to be somewhat immoral-a substantially more negative assessment
than for the more evidently "public" purpose of a hospital. Considered in
these broad terms, the data does not strongly support the hypothesis that
(2014) 39:2 Queen's LJ726
the difference in the public law approach to property rights in Canada
and the US will be reflected in distinct differences in how individuals in
the two countries respond to intrusions on their rights.
Some of the results, however, are more supportive of the hypothesis that
individual constitutional property rights reflect or shape such individual
responses. Surprisingly, the Canadian respondents felt substantially
worse than their US counterparts about being asked to move, and were
less convinced that it was morally right for them to move-despite being,
if anything, significantly more convinced that the move would benefit
the community. This more negative individual response may reflect the
absence of constitutional entrenchment of a right to property." The
US constitutional right to property makes it clear that every individual
is equally protected from (and equally exposed to) government taking
of property."8 The absence of any such universal reference point in
Canadian law may heighten the sense that an individual is being singled
out or imposed on when a government in Canada takes her property."
This also might help explain the more negative individual feelings about
expropriation in the Canadian respondents.
The results for the mall takings scenario may also provide some
support for the importance of a constitutional right as a reference point.
Canadian respondents felt significantly worse about moving and less
convinced that moving was moral than their American counterparts.
This is consistent with a heightened sense of individual vulnerability
among Canadians in the absence of a constitutional rule. However, the
respondents in the American study were statistically significantly more
negative than the Canadian respondents about government's moral
justification for taking the property if it was to be used for a mall. This
97. Conceivably, the younger cohort in the Canadian sample may also feel more strongly
about issues in general, although their relative lack of experience in owning real property
might be expected to have a contrary effect compared with the US sample.
98. Although this is a highly debatable point in fact, the form of the constitutional
constraint may generate an intuitive expectation or reflect the aspiration that such equality
of treatment will result.
99. Some indirect evidence supportive of this hypothesis is the finding that the control
for ethnic minorities is significantly associated with higher demands for compensation in
the logit regressions. One might expect minorities to have fears of being singled out, and
we do see a result consistent with the translation of such a feeling into higher demands for
financial compensation.
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is consistent with the form of the US constitutional right in its heuristic
sense, as a mall is less clearly a "public use" of the form that permits
government to take property than the alternatives. In Canada, once again,
there is no similar legal reference point that would limit the type of uses
for which government could expropriate property. While the Canadian
respondents did react negatively to the mall use, their slightly warmer
response to it in comparison with the American respondents is consistent
with a role for constitutional property rights as a reference point for
American respondents.
A similar argument might be made about the qualitatively different
effect of the Term variable on attitudes in Canada and the US. The long-
term occupation of the vignette property may not only stand in for
subjective attachment to it, but also help to consolidate an understanding
of the property as nearer to an mtuitive core of "private property" for the
respondents. As the US constitutional right protects "private property"
from government encroachment, the longer term may be more likely
to trigger reference by Americans to the constitutional right as a bar
to government interference. This might help to explain their relatively
greater sensitivity to Term, and their lower assessment of government's
moral justification and motives for the expropriation than Canadian
respondents in the long term condition.
The findings set out above are consistent with the hypothesis that
public law, in the form of a constitutional right to property, can play some
role in explaining individual responses to proposed expropriation, but
they by no means support the claim that this reference dependency is the
dominant force in explaining those responses. Despite the clear difference
in the constitutional status of property rights in Canada and the US, the
responses by individuals in the Canadian and American surveys are too
similar to conclude that this difference has led to any striking variation in
attitudes towards expropriation in the two countries.
Conclusion
Behavioural economists have begun to show empirically that
individuals may have preferences that are contingent on reference points.
Economists now take seriously the idea that culture and context may
operate as important variables in modeling the preferences and choices
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of individuals. In operationalizing these new theories of individual and
collective choice and welfare, the question of how to establish the relevant
reference points or cultural state variables looms large. The results of the
simple experiment reported in this paper suggest that caution is required
in looking to "first order" differences in formal legal systems, at least at
the level of constitutional law, as a way to answer that question. Similarly,
if the normative goal is to "reset" individual reference points, or cultural
state variables, then the results of this experiment raise doubts about the
potential for achieving this through the implementation of constitutional
rights.
The experimental design for this study-relying on comparison with
the published results of an American survey-constrains the analysis in a
number of ways. The study was focused on a particular type of property
(real, residential) and a particular type of government intervention (direct
expropriation). Despite the constitutional differences, similar levels of
legal protection exist in Canada and the US at a more "operational" level,
and this may help explain why the survey responses in the two countries
were similar. The results of this study do not rule out the possibility that
law might play a role in shaping individual preferences at an operational
level, and that differences in the hierarchical status of legal rules (i.e.,
whether they are constitutional or statutory rights) matter less than the
rule's functional content and history in shaping individual expectations.
Another problem with the current experimental design in this study
lies in the inherent difficulty of fully controlling for differences in sample
composition, recruitment methodology and survey implementation.
Even minor differences in these respects can generate effects in the data
that may influence the results. The relatively small size of the Canadian
sample and the lack of balanced sample sizes in both studies are also not
ideal.
Further examination of the potential influence of the constitutional
difference in property protection between Canada and the US might
expand the scope of property rights to different types of property, to test,
for example, whether a common affinity for "home" lies behind the similar
responses in this study. The nature of government intervention might
also be expanded to include regulatory encroachment on property rights.
The US constitutional property right sometimes requires compensation
for this type of "regulatory taking", while the lack of constitutional
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property rights in Canada have generally been a barrier to claims for
compensation. The constitutional difference in the status of property
may be more influential in this "regulatory takings" setting, when it is
associated with more practical difference in outcomes across Canada
and the US. Ideally, future studies would administer methodologically
identical surveys to representative Canadian and American samples,
potentially incorporating additional experimental variation to enhance
the range of causal conclusions that could be drawn from the results. The
current study's results raise a number of questions and suggest potential
for further work to fill in gaps in our understanding of the relationship
between legal institutions and individual preferences and attitudes.
Despite the limitations in both the Canadian and American studies
compared in this paper, the initial results remain interesting and somewhat
surprising, as they do not seem to confirm the stereotypical view that
Americans are more individualistic and more attached to private property
than Canadians. The results provide an initial window into the factors
that might influence the choices and attitudes of Canadians faced with
government expropriation of their property. Canadian respondents
appeared to resist expropriation and to require "bonus" compensation in
addition to the replacement for their homes in order to be willing to move
voluntarily. The size of that compensation premium was systematically
influenced by how long the respondents had (hypothetically) owned the
property in question; those in long-term occupation were less willing to
move, and demanded very high levels of compensation as a premium.
In terms of assessing "just compensation" for expropriation, the results
suggest that market value compensation would not have satisfied most
respondents, particularly those with a longstanding connection to the
property."co
The nature of government's proposed use for property it expropriates
did not appear to strongly influence the level of compensation that
the Canadian respondents required to give up their property, but the
government's objectives for the use of the property did appear to influence
attitudes toward the use of expropriation powers. Canadian respondents
100. While the survey does not directly incorporate this measure, the structure asks for
compensation required above that of the provision of an equivalent replacement property
nearby. By construction, this property would stand in for the "fair market value" of a
respondent's home in most assessments.
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appeared to more positively regard the morality of government's demand
for their property, the benefit to the community from the exercise of
expropriation powers, and government motives when a clearly "public"
use of the property was proposed. In contrast, attitudes are more negative
when government takes private property without a specific objective or
to transfer it to a private party. These results suggest that it is not simply
the "fact" of expropriation and the loss of their property that shape the
attitudes of individuals toward the government's power of expropriation,
but also the process that it followed. Where individuals know the
objectives and the objectives are of a public nature, Canadian respondents
appear to regard expropriation as more legitimate.
In terms of these general influences, the responses of Canadian and
American respondents to government expropriation of their property are
very similar. The effect of the stark difference in constitutional treatment
of property rights between Canada and the US largely disappears when
we look at the evidence on individual choices and attitudes generated in
the experiments reviewed in this paper.
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